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Peace.process re-emerges from the rubble 
At the end of January, a month after the tsunami struck Aceh, peace talks were resumed in Helsinki 
between the Indonesian government and GAM, the Free Aceh Movement. Although for many outsiders 
the talks came as a complete surprise, it has been confirmed that serious ejf orts were made last year to 
resume the peace process. The very fact that peace talks are happening is a significant breakthrough. 
The tsunami tragedy certainly accelerated the Helsinki 
talks. Both the government in Jakarta and the GAM leaders 
(mostly based in Sweden) were cautiously arm-twisted or 
persuaded by the tsunami donor community to give top 
priority to relief and emergency work for the population of 
Aceh. The flow of money to tsunami-struck areas was 
unprecedented, both from individuals and governments in 
all parts of the world. The only logical approach was: Aceh 
can only be rebuilt successfully once the conflict has been 
resolved. The warring parties, the Indonesian government 
(GoI) and GAM, acknowledged the significance of the new 
conditions and agreed to start a new round of talks. 
A second round of talks occurred in mid-February, again 
in Helsinki, and the Crisis Management Initiative, headed 
by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, announced a 
monthly schedule for the coming months. Observers are 
cautiously optimistic that both sides have shown enough 
goodwill to ensure continuation of the talks. A process of 
confidence- and trust-building has started and the represen-
tatives from both sides have refrained from sticking to the 
entrenched positions of independence or autonomy within 
the unitary state of Indonesia. 
Cautious optimism 
Under the auspices of the Helsinki-based CMI, an infor-
mal meeting took place in the last weekend of January 
between three Indonesian government ministers (GoI) and 
representatives of GAM in a remote location outside 
Helsinki. Martti Ahtisaari opened this first official dialogue 
between representatives of GoI and GAM. 
CMI is an NGO chaired by Martti Ahtisaari, former Finnish 
president with an impressive track record of peace resolu-
tion and conflict management activities in places like 
Kosovo, Namibia, Northern Ireland, Iraq and now Aceh. 
The present circumstances are quite different from the 
previous talks. Both GAM and GoI have the same pressing 
aim of assisting the Acehnese at a time of great tribulation 
and to ensure that humanitarian assistance functions well. A 
breakthrough for a cease-fire is definitely possible as both 
sides have made commitments to such an outcome. 
The Helsinki negotiations are likely to create their own 
dynamics. In the near future, the format for a cease-fire will 
be discussed. Other issues such as relief work and the start 
the reconstruction in the most heavily-affected areas will 
also be included in the talks. It is clear to both sides that it 
will be impossible to reconcile all the differences in a short 
period of time. Confidence and trust-building is currently 
the main aim of the Helsinki talks. Self-respect for both 
sides is necessary for the achievement of fruitful , ongoing 
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talks. So far the talks have been aimed at finding common 
ground and seeking peaceful avenues to end the armed 
conflict. 
The talks so far 
Different sources provide differing accounts of the 
achievements so far. But in general the talks have been 
welcomed by most analysts, commentators and editorial 
writers. The meet-
ings have been 
described as warm 
and full of under-
standing. It is also 
realised that a 
conflict that has 
continued for 
almost thirty years 
cannot be resolved 
in a few days. The 
offer from the 
Indonesian side 
was special auton-
omy for Aceh and 
amnesty for those 
who surrender. 
In fact, the talks 
developed into a 
broader discussion. 
In the first round, 
the humanitarian 
disaster was 
discussed as well as 
efforts to increase Head of the Indonesian delegation Hamid 
international relief Awaluddin at the Helsinki airport 
and emergency assis-
tance for the Acehnese. Gradually, other topics were covered. 
GAM argued that special autonomy for Aceh, now known 
as Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD), was an empty shell 
and suggested a discussion on self-government. This led to 
talks about the format of self-government and what its 
features would be. Will local political parties be allowed to 
participate in national elections? What will be the future 
role of GAM? Can it emerge as one of the political parties? 
Other issues raised were the release of Acehnese political 
prisoners, in particular those who in the earlier peace nego-
tiations were members of the GAM negotiating team but 
were arrested immediately after martial law was declared. 
They were tried under new anti-terror laws and were given 
extremely heavy sentences. All the GAM negotiators who 
were tried were transferred to prisons in Java except Sofyan 
Ibrahim Tiba, who fell ill and remained in prison in Banda 
Aceh to receive medical treatment. However, the tsunami 
struck the prison and Sofyan Ibrahim Tiba was drowned 
with many others being held there. 
Three senior cabinet ministers 
The Jakarta mission to Helsinki consisted of three senior 
ministers headed by Hamid Awaluddin, the Minister of 
Justice and Human Rights. The other two ministers are 
Sofyan Djalil, Minister of Communications and 
Information and Widodo A.S., Coordinating Minister for 
Politics, Law and Security. Hamid Awaluddin has an inter-
esting record: he was involved in a previous effort to 
approach the GAM leadership during the Megawati presi-
dency back in October 2003 . Yusuf Kalla who was then 
Coordinating Minister for Social Affairs, initiated the 
attempt for a rendezvous between Jakarta and the GAM 
leaders in Sweden. 
Things did not work out on that occasion as military oper: 
ations in Aceh were in full swing and President Megawatl 
was not convinced about the possibility of resolving the 
Aceh conflict by peaceful means. Yusuf Kaila's political 
position has moved upwards and is n_ow Vic_e-P~e~i?ei:it of 
Indonesia. So far he has taken many mterestmg m1tiatives. 
It was Vice-President Kalla who was involved in secret 
talks on Aceh last October, soon after he was inaugurated. 
More people became involved in the process, including 
second echelon GAM leaders in Malaysia, and several 
documents, including the granting of economic conces-
sions, were agreed. This 'warming-up' process was part of 
the confidence building that paved the way for the real talks 
to start in the post-tsunami era. 
Post-tsunami Aceh 
Aceh pre-tsunami and Aceh post-tsunami are two differ-
ent entities. Before tsunami, Aceh was a closed territory, 
basically run by the military. In the post-tsunami period 
Aceh was opened up to the outside world and became the 
focus of international attention. Th.e rebuilding and recon-
struction of Aceh became an international issue, and the 
military were unable to stop this. It also became clear to the 
international community that reconstruction would only be 
sustainable if the decades-long conflict were resolved. 
The GAM negotiators 
The GAM leadership in Sweden displayed courage and 
diplomatic skills by agreeing to participate in the Helsinki 
talks under the current conditions. GAM clearly understood 
the situation in Aceh in its international context. 
Initially, the Jakarta government said it would only enter 
negotiations if special autonomy was the main topic. 
Negotiations could therefore be taken as meaning that GAM 
had dropped its demand for independence. As it turned out, 
both sides showed wisdom and diplomatic maturity. 
Martti Ahtisaari as an experienced negotiator took the 
traditional position in peace talks of having an open agenda 
and working on the principle that 'nothing is agreed until 
everything is agreed'. Dropping the demand for indepen-
dence on the part of GAM has so far not been discussed. 
The GAM delegation included the earlier representatives 
plus some new faces. Besides Malik Mahmud, the Prime 
Minister and Zaini Abdullah, the Foreign Minister, Bachtiar 
Abdullah, Nur Djuli, Nurdin Abdul Rahman, Muzakkir 
Abdul Hamid and Teuku Hadi were part of the delegation. 
A new element in the negotiations was the inclusion of a 
few foreigners in the GAM team. Dr Vlacy Vazna and Dr. 
Damien Kingsbury joined the talks as advisors. In particu-
lar Damien Kingsbury, an experienced Indonesianist, 
played a positive role in 'softening' the position of GAM 
and in finding a peaceful and democratic way out of the 
conflict. 
The previous peace process 
The search for peace in Aceh has been long and arduous. 
During the Suharto days and until his downfall in 1998, it 
would have been inconceivable that any peace process 
could take place. It was only in the post-Suharto period, 
especially during the transition under President Habibie and 
the first elected President Abdurrahman Wahid, that efforts 
to find a peaceful solution became a feasible option. From 
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GAM delegation arriving at the Helsinki airport, from l tor, 
Zaini Abdullah, Bachtiar Abdullah and Malik Mahmud. 
1999 to 2002 a peace process was in progress, with consid-
erable success. 
On 9 December 2002 an agreement was signed in Geneva 
by Go! and GAM, under the auspices of the Geneva based 
NGO HDC (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue). This 
Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, (COHA) contained 
several important ingredients, including the cessation of 
military actions and violence, the establishment of peace 
zones, the creation of a Joint Security Committee (JSC) and 
the Implementation of All Inclusive Dialogue among the 
Acehnese. The COHA Agreement enjoyed wide support, 
both among the Acehnese and internationally, in the UN, 
the US, the EU, Japan and the ASEAN countries. 
A successful scenario for peace depends very much on 
the political will of the opposing parties. Every step on the 
road map to peace creates its own dynamics and ups and 
downs. New political conditions will create a new window 
of opportunities. Changes in the social and political condi-
tions in Aceh are very much dependent on political changes 
in Jakarta. The first years after the fall of the Suharto dicta-
torship created conducive conditions for the beginning of a 
peace process in Aceh. But in 2003 the COHA Agreement 
proved to have insufficient political backing from the main 
political forces in Jakarta, not the least from TNI, the 
Indonesian armed forces. Another weakness of the COHA 
Agreement was the lack of involvement of Acehnese civil 
society in the process. It is unfair to blame the HDC for 
these flaws. The terms of engagement were unclear partic-
ularly the lack of sanctions should either of the contracting 
parties violate the agreement created problems. The HDC 
lacked credibility in the eyes of many Acehnese because it 
was unable to intervene. The negotiated peace process was 
heading towards deadlock. 
TNI sabotages the peace process 
It was the military who decided to destroy the COHA 
agreement. When army chief-of-staff Ryamizard Ryacudu 
paid a visit to Aceh, he saw what the peace process meant in 
ACEH 
practice. Certain parts of Aceh were divided up into GAM 
areas and areas belonging to the Republic oflndonesia. This 
was too much to swallow as it meant in effect that the 
unitary state of Indonesia was being carved up. 
In May 2003, the government in Jakarta declared martial 
law in Aceh and implemented an 'integrated operation' 
which consisted primarily of military operations, the main 
objective of which was to obliterate GAM. A year later, 
martial law was re-named a civil emergency but military 
operations continued without stop. In November 2004, a 
month after Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) took over 
as president, the emergency situation was extended for 
another six months. 
As yet, after almost two years of emergency and cease-
less military operations, there have been no military gains 
for the Indonesian army, while the security situation has 
hardly improved .. Economic activities in Aceh have 
suffered tremendously as a result of the war situation. Many 
active members of Acehnese civil society organisations 
have left Aceh to find temporary shelter in cities in Java and 
Sumatra or in neighbouring Malaysia. In the post-tsunami 
era, most Acehnese have returned home to assist the relief 
work or re-establish contact with the surviving members of 
their families. 
Complications in Jakarta 
While the peace process has been greeted internation-
ally, the situation in Jakarta is ambiguous because of the 
conflicting positions being taken by some of the major 
political forces. 
The hardliners in TNI are not very happy with the resumed 
talks and insist that the military approach is the only correct 
way to handle with the rebels. But also petty- nationalist 
politicians in particular within the PDI-P, previously the 
government party, show much dismay with the position of 
accommodation towards GAM by the present government. 
The unitary state is sacred and one has to be firm, using 
force if necessary against the rebels, is the basic conviction 
of the majority of the PDI-P members of parliament. 
Maintaining and nurturing the process of the Helsinki 
talks will therefore be a difficult political task for the 
Jakarta government. The hardliners within TNI have 
increased attacks on GAM strongholds, basically to create 
the public image that GAM remains a security threat while 
in parliament strong voices emerge attacking the govern-
ment of being soft and compromising with the GAM rebels. 
In Aceh itself, so far, the Helsinki talks have been received 
by t~e society at large, with a lukewarm reception. The 
prev10us peace process collapsed two years ago and a new 
military ?peration started. People have become more wary 
and cautious before firmly embracing the new talks. It will 
take time, in particular in this period of much grief due to 
the many personal losses, before the Helsinki talks will be 
seen as a serious way out for the long lasting conflict. 
How to proceed further 
In the last two years, there have been several important 
studies t? analyse the reasons for the collapse of the peace 
process m Aceh, to seek to explain the causes of the break-
down. The Aceh conflict has become the focus for a wide 
variety of institutions around the world trying to seek new 
avenues for the advancement of the peace agenda. The role 
?f civil s?ciety in Ace.h has become quite central, not only 
m analysmg the conflict, but also in the critical role it can 
continued on back page 
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Aceh's disasters: 
man-made, natural then man-made 
Acehnese survivors of the tsunami may not be as lucky as you think. It is almost impossible to imag-
ine what life is like for tsunami survivors. Not only have they lost so many of their loved ones and all 
their worldly goods, but they have to try to rebuild their lives against the background of an ongoing 
conflict that is nothing less than a man-made disaster. What is now needed is not only to rebuild Aceh 's 
infrastructure, but also to resolve the ongoing conflict in the province. 
Try to imagine Fatimah's life. She was the wife, now the 
widow, of a local journalist. When she woke up on the 
morning of December 26th she had a family, two kids and a 
loving husband, a home, and dreams for their future. By 
mid-afternoon she was alone, searching for her two children 
and her husband. On 27th December, she woke up in a 
temporary camp for the displaced, along with thousands of 
others. Her only remaining hope was to find the bodies of 
her family. Forty-year old Fatimah is a simple Acehnese 
woman with simple dreams who has lost absolutely every-
thing, and more. 
When TAPOL met her in a refugee camp in Banda Aceh, 
she blamed herself for being alive. 'Why have I survived? 
Why was I spared?' But this is her fate. She has to build a new 
life. Over 250,000 people do not have this opportunity. They 
are all gone, killed by the most powerful natural disaster in 
the history of Indonesia, let alone Aceh. The tsunami has left 
400,000 displaced people. It has destroyed half the Acehnese 
capital, Banda Aceh, swathes of Greater Aceh (Aceh Besar) 
as well as Calang and Meulaboh. For the Acehnese who have 
survived, they are living in a different world. 
But even before the tsunami struck, Aceh was a disaster 
zone, a disaster caused by men. When the tsunami hit in 
December, the province was living under the second phase 
of civil emergency law. Civil emergency law, which is 
simply a continuation of the earlier martial law status, 
imposed restrictions on the population and destroyed their 
livelihoods. The conflict has claimed over three thousand 
lives in the last two years. More people were killed in Aceh 
in the two years before the tsunami than during the same 
period in Palestine and Israel. It has destroyed huge chunks 
of the infrastructure. According to the local government, at 
least 40 percent of the local population were living in 
poverty as a result of the conflict. 
More security posts than schools 
· When TAPOL travelled from Medan to Banda Aceh in 
January, the number of police and military security posts far 
outnumbered the medical centres and schools. 
Since the fall of Suharto, Aceh, unlike the rest oflndonesia, 
has experienced little change. Pre-tsunami Aceh continued 
to resemble Indonesia under Suharto. The military and 
police continue to control not only security but also politics. 
Aceh is the only place where the military's dwi fungsi (dual 
function) giving it both political and security responsibili-
ties, continues in theory as well as in practice. Several 
districts and sub-districts are under military control. The 
current 'civilian' authority is in the hands of the police. 
Numerous restrictions have been imposed on the local 
population. The tsunami is just the tip of the iceberg. 
Former US Presidents Bill Clinton and H. W. Bush in Aceh 
Among the refugees in the settlement in Banda Aceh, there 
is a joke: 'Sukarno, Suharto, Susilo and (T)sunami.' They 
are all the same, purveyors of chaos for the Acehnese. 
Yet nevertheless the Acehnese still feel optimistic. Locals 
talk about how the horror of the tsunami can provide an 
opportunity, a 'silver lining', to build a new Aceh. This new 
Aceh should be - and can be - different. According to 
Rufriadi, chair of the Legal Aid Foundation (Aceh), who has 
also lost everything, building this new Aceh is not just about 
infrastructure or development, it is also about building peace. 
Acehnese excluded from planning process 
However, this new Aceh is definitely not the one outlined 
in a blueprint drawn up by BAPPENAS, the National 
Planning Board. There are no provisions for dealing with 
the conflict. It simply aims to return Aceh to 'normality', in 
other words, the conflict-ridden Aceh that existed on 
December 25th. Aceh's pre-tsunamj 'normality' was abnor-
mal. And yet few of the reconstruction plans on the table 
even mention peace-building. Numerous foreign aid agen-
cies completely overlook the fact that Aceh is a conflict 
zone. It is not just the ground zero of a monumental natural 
disaster, but of a thirty-year conflict. 
The inadequacies of the planning and the blueprint are not 
surprising given that, once again, the Acehnese people have 
not been involved in discussions about their future. Once 
again, their future is being handed down to them from on-
high, namely from Jakarta. Regardless of all the pledges by 
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Jakarta that the local people would be consulted, that there 
is no mechanism for the inclusion of the Acehnese in the 
process of reconstruction. In fact, a recent attempt by 
several Indonesian and Acehnese civil society groups in 
Central Aceh to hold a discussion forum on the reconstruc-
tion process and how to involve people was banned by the 
civil emergency authorities. If the Acehnese are not 
involved in either the direction or detail of their homeland's 
reconstruction, or in discussions for the terms of peace in 
their homeland, they will be doubly disenfranchised . 
A vast undertaking 
The international community must be given latitude in their 
work to support the Acehnese people and the reconstruction 
of their homeland. Yet this involvement is currently under 
threat. The government recently set a deadline of 26th 
March for foreign workers in Aceh to leave the devastated 
province. Initially the deadline was set only for foreign 
troops, but recent statements from the Police Task Force 
spokesman in Aceh indicate that this is being expanded to 
include certain foreign humanitarian groups as well. The 
province should be open to anybody offering assistance. 
However the problems are not simply generated by the 
government. There is also a clear lack of understanding or 
knowledge about Aceh among most agencies now working 
in the province. The personnel brought in from all over the 
world are undoubtedly experts in their specialities but they 
know nothing of the local people or the problems they have 
been confronting for the whole of their lives. While most 
have some understanding about the long-term conflict, 
there seems to be little understanding of, let alone planning 
for, an active military presence, weak civilian structures and 
a terrorised population. 
Until the government started issuing statements about the 
restricted access to Aceh, many agencies were not even 
aware that they may only have a limited time to execute 
their plans. Despite government statements about foreigners 
leaving, none of them has any back-up plans. Nothing is 
being said about what will be done with the billions of 
dollars already allocated in the event that the agencies' 
personnel are not allowed to enter the province. Nor is there 
any discussion about what form support from local partners 
will take. People are not even acknowledging that they are 
being outmanoeuvred. Everyone is too frantic playing the 
Good Samaritan in the here and now to make plans to see 
the reconstruction through. 
Add to this pile of problems the dismal fact that Indonesia 
has an appalling record for corruption, it is easy to predict 
that much of the money being poured into Aceh will end up 
in the pockets of greedy government officials. 
There is a terrible risk that the Acehnese are going to be 
abandoned by the international community yet again in this, 
their time of greatest need. People like Fatimah need donors 
and deliverers to make a political push to ensure ongoing 
access and reconstruction. If this is not done now, the door 
will soon be closed again. The way government spokes-
men talk these days, it's as if Aceh is still under the civil 
emergency law. * 
--~~-----~--~-~-~-
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Restrictions on the media in Aceh 
The international journalists' organisation, Reporters with-
out Borders, has expressed concern about mounting restric-
tions on journalists working in Aceh. It has asked the 
Indonesian authorities to explain why freelance journalist 
William Nessen was expelled from Indonesia on 24 January 
after arresting him as he was about to leave Aceh. Nessen, 
who files stories for the Sydney Morning Herald and the San 
Francisco Chronicle, is the only journalist to have reported 
on the military campaign in Aceh in May 2003 from the 
rebels' side. When he was forced out of the bush, he was 
arrested and sentenced to forty days for immigration viola-
tions, then banned from entering Indonesia for a year. The 
ban has since been extended for another year to August 2005 
Previously, Martin Chulov and Renne Nowytager of The 
Australia were threatened and asked to leave the area by 
Indonesian soldiers who had just come under fire from 
GAM. 'Your duty is to observe the disaster and not the war 
between the army and the GAM,' an officer told them. 
Michael Lev from the Chicago·Tribune, and his Indonesian 
assistant, Handewi Pramesti, were arrested on 29 December 
by soldiers in Meulaboh, Aceh, and held for 28 hours. 
While several hundred foreign journalists went to Aceh 
after the tsunami, the Indonesian military announced on 15 
January that journalists and humanitarian workers were 
restricted to visiting only Banda Aceh and Meulaboh and 
were warned that they would be expelled if they did not 
inform the military of their plans. 
Then Bruno Bonamigo of the state-owned Radio Canada 
was prevented by the authorities from going to Sigli, in the 
north of Aceh province, to follow the work of Doctors 
Without Borders. 
As Reporters Without Borders reports, the local press in 
Aceh was severely hit by the tsunami. Twenty local jour-
nalists were killed or went missing. The local daily, Serambi 
whose printing press was destroyed, was miraculously able 
to resume publication within a few days. 
The international journalists' organisation also points out 
that as a result of restrictions imposed by the military, 
Indonesian and foreign journalists have been required to 
attached themselves to army 'pools' in order to enter the 
theatre of operations while local media workers have been 
subjected to strict surveillance by the authorities.* 
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No end to repression in Aceh 
One of Aceh 's best-known youth leaders, who is now serving his second term in prison, recently 
succeeded in smuggling out an account of his own arrest and detention. He gives a harrowing account 
of the human rights situation in Aceh since the tsunami and describes the treatment of many fellow 
prisoners now being held in gaols all over Java. 
Nazar was first arrested in 2000 and held for nearly a 
year. He was taken into custody for a second time on 12 
February 2003 and is now being held in Lowok Waru 
Prison, Malang, East Java. He campaigned for years for a 
referendum in Aceh and heads SIRA, Senter Informasi 
Referendum Aceh, (Information Centre for a Referendum 
in Aceh). SIRA is committed to holding a referendum in 
Aceh as the peaceful way to resolve the conflict that has 
continued without respite since the late 1980s. 
His report, No End to Repression in Aceh, was smuggled 
out of prison on 12 February, 2005, the second anniversary 
of his arrest. The following are extracts from his report: 
Secret operations 
Since the imposition of martial law (on 19 May 2003), I 
have personally seen and heard many terrible things about 
the treatment of detainees being held in cells at Mapolda 
Acheh * (Regional Police headquarters, Acheh). 
Testimonies reveal that conditions are even worse in deten-
tion posts run by TNI/Polri (Indonesian Armed Forces and 
Police). Moreover, there are many official and unofficial 
posts which are conducting secret operations. 
As soon as martial law was declared, a huge number of 
arrests were made throughout Acheh. This is just the same 
as during the hidden war in Acheh from 1989 to 1998 when 
Acheh was a Daerah Operasi Militer (Military Operations 
Zone). Since martial law was declared, war and violence 
have been waged openly in Acheh though it has been diffi-
cult to get the information out. 
Since martial law, more than three thousand Acehnese 
have been arrested and detained for alleged membership of 
or sympathy with GAM, the Gerakan Acheh Merdeka (Free 
Acheh Movement). This does not include those who have 
been abducted and who disappeared without legal process. 
Achehnese detainees are well aware of the fact that a 
considerable number of people have been arrested and 
interrogated in TNI/Polri posts and have then disappeared 
or been murdered. 
An objective study would certainly discover that more than 
ninety per cent of the detainees are ordinary civilians; less 
than ten per cent are GAM members or sympathisers. And 
in any case, GAM members and sympathisers are also enti-
tled to being treated well. Because of the dreadful torture 
inflicted during arrest, interrogation and investigation, 
many of the detainees have opted to say whatever their 
captors want them to say as the only way to stay-alive. The 
GAM negotiators who, until their arrest, were involved in 
talks with their Indonesian counterparts and who were 
arrested when martial law was declared, have also been 
subjected to ill treatment during interrogation. 
Fascist and racist 
I can only conclude from everything I have witnessed that 
fascist, racist repression is being inflicted on the Achehnese 
people, those in prison as well as those outside. People strug-
gling for their basic rights are being arrested and detained, 
abducted and made to disappear. Even those who have been 
abducted and rendered powerless have been maltreated. 
Since Acheh was struck by the earthquake and tsunami on 
26 December 2004, anyone watching the situation will 
know that these things are still happening. Along with 
maltreatment, the distribution of international aid has been 
manipulated for political and security reasons. All these 
things are intended to safeguard Indonesia's territorial 
integrity from Acheh to Papua, and safeguard the country's 
constitution. The Indonesian government justifies these 
injustices in the name of law enforcement. 
My arrest and detention 
At 1.50 am on 12 February 2003 , on Idul Adha, dozens of 
Indonesian police from the Banda Acheh police command, 
backed up by police from the Acheh police command led by 
Commissioner Truno Yudho, came to arrest me; this was my 
second arrest. They were not wearing uniform and were 
heavily armed. They surrounded my home and kicked down 
the doors. While some of them mishandled books, docu-
ments and clothes of a relative of mine, others kicked down 
the front fence and forced the door down with their weapons. 
When my family and I woke up, we realised that several 
vehicles had stopped in front of the house. The men jumped 
over the fence and surrounded the house. At first we did not 
open the door, suspecting that these were OTK (unidenti-
fied people). Two months ago, a member of the SIRA 
Presidium Council, Musliadi, was abducted by OTK. Three 
days later, his body was found with signs of terrible 
violence. It was discovered by Red Cross volunteers who 
found it in a valley in the Seulawah mountains, not far from 
the State Police School in Saree, Acheh Besar. 
When the intruders identified themselves as police from 
the Banda Acheh police command, a relative opened the 
front door. The men pushed their way in and entered the 
room where I and my family were sleeping. With weapons 
at the ready, they handcuffed me and took me to the guest 
room where I was ordered to sign an arrest warrant. 
While this was happening, other men were chucking our 
belongings all over the place. When my wife protested, 
angry words were exchanged. The men in the front room 
grabbed my laptop along with the hard disk; this has not yet 
been returned. 
With my hands handcuffed behind my back, I was pushed 
into a minibus and driven to Banda Acheh police headquar-
ters, with two vehicles full of police trailing behind. The 
handcuffs were not removed till 4 am when I was put in a 
dirty police cell. Later that day, I was transferred to another 
cell for investigation. 
Until the trial, I was held in Acheh police headquarters. I 
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was not moved to Keudah Banda Acheh prison until 24 
April 2003, after my lawyers and I had protested and 
boycotted the court hearings. Then, on 24 May, a few days 
after the declaration of martial law, I was suddenly moved 
again this time to a cell in Acheh police headquarters where 
I was held for more than a year, then moved to Lowok Waru 
Prison, in Malang, East Java, on 17 May 2004. 
Prior to my arrest, I had not received a summons, which is 
what should have happened. But threats that I would be 
arrested were made by the Acheh chief of police in the press 
in late January, when SIRA activists were involved in 
peaceful actions, holding meetings and discussions to 
promote a cease fire between Indonesia and GAM, calling 
for freedom of expression and for a referendum to allow the 
Achehnese determine their own future. We were calling for 
basic human rights, freedom, justice and peace throughout 
Acheh. Meetings were taking place all over Acheh and 
attended by thousands of people. 
Preparing for military operations 
At the time of my arrest, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who 
was then Minister-Coordinator for Political and Security 
Affairs, as well as the Armed Forces commander and the chief 
of police were in Banda Acheh. Preparations were underway 
to create the necessary conditions for a military solution; pro-
Indonesian militias were being recruited, the vast majority of 
whom were non-Achehnese. Clearly, most Achehnese were 
not in favour of the special autonomy offered by Jakarta. The 
government seemed to be looking for ways to undermine 
COHA (Cessation of Hostilities Agreement) which had been 
concluded with GAM on 9 December 2002. The day after my 
arrest, these top-ranking Indonesian officials told the press 
that they fully supported my arrest. 
Shortly before my first arrest on 20 November 2000, the 
Minister-Coordinator and top-ranking TNI and Polri offi-
cials who were in Banda Acheh and Medan talked about 
taking action against SIRA and me. This was when we were 
busy polling millions of Achehnese. Of course, we would 
not stop these peaceful actions, but the army and police did 
what they could to frustrate our activities. On one occasion 
in mid-November, several people attending public rallies 
were killed and many were injured. I was arrested and held 
for ten months and twenty days. 
The charges against me 
The charges this time round were the same as during my 
first arrest, based on laws that were introduced by the Dutch 
to clamp down on freedom struggles. I was accused of 
violating Article 154 of the Criminal Code and Article 10 of 
Law No. 9, 1998 for spreading hatred against the 
Indonesian government and holding public meetings with-
out police permission. · 
As my defence lawyers say, it is easy for the judiciary to 
lay these charges without concrete proof; it's a way of halt-
ing activities that the government doesn't like, even though 
it means violating people's human rights. These articles are 
so elastic that the people in power can do what they like. 
They are the same as the anti-subversion laws enforced 
during the Suharto era. They were not used when B.J. 
Habibie was president when political prisoners were actu-
ally released, including members of GAM. But under 
Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati Sukamoputri and Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono, they are in use again. I am one of 
many Achehnes~ activists targeted by these laws. 
During my interrogation, the animosity towards SIRA 
I 
ACEH 
activists was very obvious. Our peaceful activities were 
regarded as being hostile to Indonesia's territorial integrity. 
Of course, these officials were not worried about the terri-
ble things they were doing towards Achehnese, nor would 
they acknowledge that Achehnese are entitled to the funda-
mental right to live in freedom, justice and peace. They 
were doing the bidding of the government, including the 
armed forces, in their war against Acheh. 
On 16 June 2003, the prosecutor called for me to be 
sentenced to six years under Article 154, the maximum 
penalty for which is seven years. On 1 July, which happens 
to be my birthday. The panel of judges sentenced me to five 
years. My defence lawyers said this was out of all propor-
tion; in other cases tried under this article, the longest 
sentence has been one year. The appeal court and the 
Supreme Court upheld the sentence. It is a political verdict 
and has nothing to do with the law. 
Treatment during police detention 
Verbal abuse, intimidation and terror were part of the daily 
routine during detention by the Acheh police. During the 
first few weeks, the Acheh chief of police used the morning 
roll-call to hype up his men; I heard him through the loud-
speaker. He called a rebel, a provocateur, the brains behind 
GAM, a Jewish agent, a US agent, an agent of the west. 
After roll-call , his men were in a state of fury against me. 
I was physically abused on 19 February 2004. While under 
interrogation, a weapon was aimed at me and I was punched 
and kicked. Intelligence officers were involved in this 
brutality, which went on till early next morning. They had 
found an article I had written promoting a peace process in 
Acheh and describing the condition of prisoners. I had sent 
it to several international human rights organisations. Then 
my wife was interrogated. 
I was also brutally treated on a flight in an Air Force heli-
copter, to a prison in East Java on 17 May 2004. My hands 
and feet had been bound, and I and other Achehnese pris-
oners were beaten in the face and chest. 
During my detention in Mapolda-Acheh, the only visi-
tors allowed to visit me were close relatives and my 
lawyers, after a lot of bureaucratic hassle. Journalists were 
not allowed to visit or interview me. After martial law was 
declared, most of my lawyers were afraid to go on assisting 
me after being terrorised over the phone. My wife and rela-
tives were also terrorised but continued to visit me. 
Since being moved to Lowok Waru, we prisoners have not 
been physically abused, but anyone who visits me is closely 
watched. Journalists are still not allowed to interview me. 
In Mapolda-Acheh, I have often seen other prisoners being 
maltreated, slapped or struck with a bayonet or other hard 
objects. They have been hung up on a wall, burnt with ciga-
rettes or doused with filthy water. They are forced to sing the 
Indonesian national anthem or repeat the Pancasila by heart. 
If they fail, they are maltreated by the police. On arrival in 
the prison, new prisoners must march in line or beat each 
other. There is also sexual abuse while being showered with 
accusations that they are GAM members or sympathisers; 
they are told to touch each other with their tongues or lick 
each other's armpits, or even have intercourse. 
Acheh needs support 
There is no freedom, justice or human rights in Acheh; 
crimes against humanity are being perpetrated by a fascist, 
racist colonial power. This has been going on for sixty 
years; ever since our annexation, the Achehnese people 
continued on back page 
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Munir's murder, a high-level conspiracy 
In our last issue, we reported the sudden, tragic death of Munir, Indonesia's most outspoken 
human rights activist. The cause of death was not then clear though many suspected foul play. 
Forensic tests in Holland revealed massive traces of arsenic in his body. Investigations now under-
way suggest that Indonesia's intelligence agency, BIN, masterminded the crime, while several 
high-ranking Garuda officials were accomplices. 
Munir died on 7 September, wliile on board a Garuda 
flight from Jakarta to Amsterdam. He died two hours before 
arriving at Schiphol. He was travelling to Utrecht where he 
was planning to take a master's degree in human rights at 
the university. Garuda is Indonesia's state-owned civil avia-
tion company. 
believed that the perpetrator was not acting alone but was 
acting on orders from a government official'. 
HRW: 'A class by himself 
Accolades for the slain activist have come from all comers 
of the globe. Joe Saunders of Human Rights Watch based in 
New York, said: 'He was a class by himself. He had 
an electric intelligence and an encyclopaedic 
memory. In meetings, he was able to draw on a kalei-
doscope of detailed fact and sharp analytical insight 
to present a clear insight of what needed to be done.' 
Sidney Jones, who had known Munir for many years, 
in her days at Amnesty International, then at Human 
Rights Watch and most recently with the International 
Crisis Group, described Munir as everything a human 
. rights activist should be. 'Tough, principled, smart, 
funny, fearless. He stood up to people in power, made 
them angry, got threat after threat, and never gave up.' 
[Asia Times, 16 November 2004] 
Sixty-eight laureates of the Right Livelihood Award 
from more than two dozen countries, signed a state-
ment describing Munir's assassination as 'an evil 
crime that strikes not only at the victim and his loved 
ones but is also a warning to the human rights 
Suciwati unveiling Munir 's statue community in Indonesia, a crime intended to make human 
Soon after his death, a murder investigation was started by 
the Indonesian police, Polri. Scores of witnesses have been 
questioned, including passengers and crew on the flight, but 
the police have so far been unable to identify any suspects. 
Under pressure from Munir's widow, Suciwati, and a 
number of NGOs in Jakarta who were frustrated with the 
lack of progress by the police, the President agreed to the 
establishment of a fact-finding team to work side by side 
with the police. The team is headed by a senior police detec-
tive, Brigadier-General Marsudi Hanafi, and includes 
several police officers as well as human rights activists, 
Hendardi, formerly director of a leading human rights 
NGO, the PBHI, Usman Hamid, who heads Kontras, the 
Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence 
which was set up by Munir in 1998, Munarman who heads 
the Indonesian Human Rights Institute, YLBHI, and 
Asmara Nababan, a former general secretary of Indonesia's 
human rights commission. 
During a meeting in early March with members of the fact-
finding team, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
referred to the investigation 'as a test case for whether 
Indonesia has changed'. [Republika, 4 March] He also said 
that no state agency should be exempted from investigation; 
all were obliged to co-operate fully to track down the perpe-
trator. Later, Hendardi a member of the team, told Radio 
Netherlands that this was crucial 'because it is widely 
rights activists throughout Indonesia fear for their own 
safety, whether at home or on their travels abroad. We wish 
to express our solidarity with, and support for, the human 
rights community in Indonesia and wish them the fortitude 
to cope with the possible dangers they now confront.' 
Munir was awarded the Right Livelihood Award in 2000. 
A threat to human rights activists 
The Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights 
Defenders, based in Paris, warned in a statement that inci-
dents which followed Munir's death, in particular, the mailing 
to his widow, Suciwati, of a dead chicken, to which was 
attached a note warning her not to link her husband's death to 
the TNI, the Indonesian Army, suggests that his death was a 
politically-motivated assassination 'which represents a seri-
ous threat to the human rights community in Indonesia as a 
whole'. It recalled that the office of KONTRAS, the 
Commission for the Disappeared and the Victims of Violence, 
the NGO which was co-founded by Munir, had been attacked 
once in 2002 and twice in May 2003 in relation to its activi-
ties as well as for its criticism of the Indonesian 
Government's policy in handling the Aceh problem. 
In fact, the first threat of physical violence against Munir 
occurred on 20 August 2001 when a bomb wrapped in a 
plastic bag was sent to his parents' home in Malang, East 
Java, while he was on a visit. Munir said in his usual laconic 
fashion: 'I guess it was only a warning'. 
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Because of Munir's unrelenting advocacy of many issues 
ranging from abuses in East Timor, West Papua and Aceh to 
the unexplained disappearance of numerous Indonesian 
activists a few months before the resignation of President 
Suharto in May 1998, those likely to have plotted Munir's 
murder include individuals and agencies right across the 
state apparatus. At the time of his death, Munir was known 
to be collecting evidence of corruption inside a government 
ministry. In an interview with the Indonesian weekly, 
Tempo, Munir spoke about 'important information' the 
nature of which he could not divulge over the phone. He 
indicated that the case involVed important figures in the 
Republic, and 
was related to 
budget details of 
a ministry 
project whose 
value had been 
inflated. Tempo 
later revealed 
(November 23-
29, 2004) that, 
according to 
Munir, 'a partic-
ular military 
officer knew the 
full story about 
the ministerial 
corruption' and 
had indicated 
that he was 
prepared to talk. 
It is understood 
that the ministry 
in question was 
the Ministry of 
Defence. 
According to Tempo, this case presented Munir with a 
whole new set of problems as he normally worked on 
human rights violations, but regardless of this, he said he 
was determined to get to the bottom of the case. 
Mastermind and accomplices 
The decision to eliminate Munir could to have been taken 
at BIN (Badan Intelijen Negara), the State Intelligence 
Agency. The crime was perpetrated on board Indonesia's 
national flag-carrier, Garuda and it is virtually certain that 
the poison was put into a cup of tea which Munir drank 
during the first leg of the trip, from Jakarta to Singapore. 
During a short stopover at Changi airport, Munir who was 
in good health when he boarded the plane at Sukarno-Hatta 
Airport in Jakarta, sent a message to his wife complaining 
of stomach pains but it was not until after the plane's dep~r­
ture from Changi that Munir started to suffer acute vomit-
ing and diarrhoea. 
Another passenger on the plane was Pollycarpus Budihari 
Priyanto, an Airbus 330 pilot who has worked for Garu~a 
for nineteen years. This man had made no secret of his 
intense interest in Munir's travel plans. A few days before 
Munir's departure, he phoned Munir's home and spoke to 
his wife Suciwati. asking about her husband's plans .. 
Several human rights activists also say they received calls 
from him, including Hendardi. who says he was asked for 
his views about the political situation and whether he was 
planning to visit West Papua. 
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After the passengers had boarded GA974 in Jakarta, 
Pollycarpus approached Munir who had an economy cla~s 
seat, and offered him his business class seat which Mu~ 
accepted. He sat beside him during the first leg. It 1s 
believed that the arsenic was dropped into a cup of tea 
which Munir drank during the short run from Jakarta to 
Singapore. When the plane landed for a stopover at Changi 
Airport, Singapore, Pollycarpus left the plane and did not 
continue the journey to Amsterdam. 
During the second leg, Munir started vomiting violently. 
Asteward consulted Dr Tarmidzi, a passenger, who gave 
Munir a pill to 
stop the 
vomiting . 
The treat-
ment calmed 
Munir down 
and he fell 
asleep in a 
seat near the 
toilet, allo-
cated to him 
because of 
his constant 
need to 
relieve 
himself. 
When 
morning 
came and the 
stewards 
were prepar-
ing to serve 
breakfast, 
one of them 
asked Dr 
Tarmidzi to 
check on Munir's condition as there was no sign of move-
ment. The doctor pronounced that Munir was already dead. 
This was about two hours before the plane landed at Schiphol 
Airport. 
The results of an autopsy undertaken in The Netherlands 
were not made available for more than a month. The delay 
was apparently caused because initial examination 
produced such alarming results that Dutch forensic experts 
decided to conduct a number of additional tests before 
concluding that there were excessively high levels of 
arsenic in Munir's body. 
Munir's body was later flown back to Indonesia accom-
panied by his widow, Suciwati, and he was buried in his 
birthplace, Malang, in East Java. 
Fact-finding team investigations 
When the preliminary report of the fact-finding team 
were made public on 3 March, the murder case attracted 
renewed interest in the media. The fact-finding team 
announced at a press conference that their initial findings 
had led to the conclusion that Munir had died as the result 
of a conspiracy. 'There is hard evidence that the murder of 
Munir is a conspiracy. There is no way it was committed by 
individuals,' said Brigadier-General Marsudi Hanafi, head 
of the team. 
He went on to say that the team had uncovered indications 
of involvement of certain Garuda employees and a Garuda 
director. Problems had arisen because neither Garud~or 
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PT Angkasa Pura, the company that manages Sukamo-
Hatta Airport at Cengkareng, were willing to co-operate. 
Team member Asmara Nababan told the press that both the 
fact-finding team and the police were keen to track down 
the person who persuaded Garuda and Angkasa Pura not to 
co-operate with the investigations. 
'There are strong indications that Garuda's employees were 
directly or indirectly involved in Munir's death,' said 
Marsudi Hanafi. 'We found evidence that showed Garuda 
officials conspired to cover up the wrong-doing uncovered 
by the team.' [AP, 3 March] 
The likely role of Garuda executives 
There are three layers to the conspiracy and two major 
state agencies, the intelligence agency, BIN, and the coun-
try's flag-carrier Garuda are involved. Pollycarpus, the man 
who has emerged as the prime suspect for administering the 
poison that killed Munir, is closely connected with both. 
Information has come to light that the procedures for 
Pollycarpus' assignment to fly on board GA974 were 
riddled with irregularities. The first was a letter signed by 
Garuda's CEO, Indra Setiawan, giving him an assignment in 
charge of aviation security. It is highly unusual for such an 
assignment to be made by a top executive of the company. 
A second letter assigning the same pilot as aviation security 
on GA 974 bore the date 4 September but it was later 
discovered that the date had been falsified as it had been 
written and signed several days later. The third was a letter 
changing Pollycarpus' flight to Singapore to late evening, 
after the pilot allegedly explained that he had business to 
conduct in Singapore. 
These letters have cast a cloud over senior Garuda execu-
tives. CEO Indra Setiawan has been questioned at length 
about his role by the fact-finding team and a commission of 
the DPR, Indonesia's parliament, which is conducting its 
own investigations. On both occasions, he is reported to 
have been close to tears. He initially denied that he knew 
Pollycarpus but was later forced to withdraw this denial, 
having signed several letters regarding his assignment. 
On no fewer than three occasions, Garuda executives have 
failed to arrange a re-enactment of flight GA974 with the 
crew members who were on duty, alleging that the crew 
were not available. 
Intelligence agency BIN 
While Garuda officials have emerged as the likely accom-
plices, much more importance is now being attached to the 
agency which masterminded the crime, the intelligence 
agency BIN. Few people would dare to take on the country's 
most feared agency, whose agents are not averse to elimi-
nating people in cold blood. It was therefore crucial that the 
President's spokesperson, State Secretary Yusril Ihza 
Mahendra made it clear that no state agencies, including 
BIN (Badan Intelijens Negara), the State Intelligence 
Agency, should be exempted from the inquiries. Yusril said 
that the fact-finding team was permitted to investigate the 
agency. 'Nothing is closed,' he said. 'The President wants 
everything about Munir's death to be fully investigated. The 
case must be handling in accordance with the law, and taken 
to court,' he said. 
Fact-finding team member Asmara Nababan said it was 
difficult to understand what advantage Garuda could reap 
from such a conspiracy. 'What we need to know is who was 
behind Garuda.' 
Another team member, Usman Hamid, director of 
KONTRAS said that there was evidence linking BIN to 
Munir's de;th but he could not at present elaborate. 'The 
fact-finding team is no longer at the first level of inquiry -
the perpetrator on the ground - but has advanced to the 
second level, those behind the people on the ground.' 
In what was a very cautious and carefully wo_rded state-
ment he also said: 'We have now reached the pomt of look-
ing b~yond the location of the crime. Who is it who had.an 
interest in (committing) this murder? Our i:ext ste~, which 
we discussed with the President, is to consider the mvolve-
ment of members of BIN.' He welcomed the positive signal 
given by the President but said they would need to . see 
whether this would bear fruit on the ground. 'There is a 
possibility of failure but there is also the possibility of 
success.' [Radio Netherlands, 8 March 2005] 
· An SMS text message has come to light which states that 
Garuda pilot Pollycarpus was recruited by Muchdi PR, 
deputy of Section V of BIN as an intelligence agent in an 
assignment letter Skep Ka BIN 113/2/2002, and that he was 
issued with a pistol. The SMS went on to say that 'after 
Polly's name began to appear in the media, he w.as order.ed 
to hand back the pistol and all documents relatmg to him 
were destroyed. The order came from Muchdi and two other 
BIN members seen as being the 'gang of three' who control 
the agency. It also confirmed that Pollycarpus had made 
frequent visits to BIN to meet Muchdi PR, in order to plan 
Munir's murder. They were worried that when he travelled 
abroad, he would expose more information about the 
kidnapping of activists at the end of 1997, as the Suharto era 
was coming to an end. 
Accidental or deliberate? 
The police are reported to be so frustrated by the evasive 
and contradictory replies from Pollycarpus that they have 
decided to use a lie detector in future interrogation sessions 
and to arrange for a psychologist to be present. 
At the beginning of March, there was yet more intriguing 
news about Pollycarpus. According to a story filed by 
detik.com, Indonesia's leading Internet news agency, 
Pollycarpus was involved in a road accident on 26 February 
when riding home on his motorbike. He was hit from 
behind by a car in a quiet street and knocked to the ground. 
The car drove off so quickly that Pollycarpus was unable to 
see its registration number. Not surprisingly, his lawyer 
wondered whether this was accidental or deliberate. This is 
a man who can be expected to spill the beans in order to 
save his own skin. 
Given the recent burst of information about the murder of 
Munir, there may now be more reason to hope that arrests 
will soon be made and those responsible for this despicable 
crime will be called to account in a court of law. The 
complexities of the case, involving perpetrator, accomplices 
and mastermind, will make this a milestone in Indonesia's 
human rights history. * 
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TNI changes at the top 
The first major reshuffle of the TN/, the Indonesian armed forces, was announced on Saturday, 29 
January 2005. This is a major and delicate political step taken by the new SBY government. Rocking 
the boat of TN/ too much can have far reaching consequences. The TN/ continues to be Indonesia's 
political power-house which is why it is important to assess the implications of this reshuffle on the 
political scene. 
The reshuffle had been in the pipeline for several months 
and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) was 
under considerable pressure from the DPR (Parliament) to 
replace Endriartono Sutarto by General Ryamizard 
Ryacudu, a notorious hardliner who until recently held the 
position of army chief-of-staff. 
Succession of the President comes first 
Forty-two key TNI officers have been replaced in the re-
shuffle, while names have been doing the rounds for weeks 
among TNI-watchers. For example, General Ryacudu's 
name has been floated for many months as most likely to 
become the TNl's first man. In the final month of her pres-
idency, Megawati had pushed in the DPR for four-star 
General Ryamizard Ryacudu (RR) to take over as the new 
was promoted to become military commander of Jakarta, a 
promotion that usually leads to top positions. 
The appointment of the new air force chief-of-staff came 
as a kind of surprise as Air Vice-Marshall Djoko Suyanto 
has only two stars whereas the position is usually occupied 
by a three-star general. His previous position, held since 
2003, was operational assistant at air force headquarters. He 
entered the Milltary Academy in 1973 and quickly won his 
flying brevet. He went to Australia and the US for further 
training, to become a flying instructor. In 2001 he became 
the air force territorial commander in Region II, which 
encompasses the whole of eastern Indonesia. His CV also 
includes operational activities in East Timor, West Papua 
andAceh. 
The rise of Vice-Admiral Slamet Soebijanto, the new 
TNI C-in-C. It is a public secret that RR and Taufik --· 
Kiemas, Megawati's husband, are close buddies 
not only because they come from the same region 
(Palembang, South Sumatra) but also because they 
share the same rigid nationalist credo as Megawati 
and Taufik Kiemas. 
The appointment of high-ranking officials, 
including the TNI top echelon, is a presidential 
prerogative but in this post-dictatorship era it has 
become a tradition to consult the DPR. Since it was 
so close to the presidential election, it was decided 
to leave the appointment of the TNI chief until 
after a new president had been installed. 
All the President's men 
On 22 February, almost a month after the chiefs-
of-staff of the army, navy and air force had been 
replaced, C-in-C General Endriartono Sutarto was 
still in place while RR, who headed the shortlist of 
candidates, had not been appointed as his successor. 
Moreover, it was now just two months before his retirement 
in April 2005. 
The new army Chief of Staff is Lt. General Djoko Santoso 
who moved up from being deputy chief-of-staff. He is 
known to be close to the President. In his early years as a 
young officer, he served under SBY in a sub-district military 
command in Yogyakarta. Djoko Santoso was almost pre-
destined to become the new army chief as his career had 
advanced in accordance with normal procedures. He entered 
the Military Academy in 1975 and after graduating, he held 
positions in several territorial commands as well as occupy-
ing the position of intelligence assistant at army headquarters 
in 1998. In 2000 he became commander of the prestigious 
second division ofKostrad, the main strike force of the army. 
He name became very well-known when he was appointed 
military commander in the conflict area of Maluku. During 
his term, violence there gradually subsided so as reward, he 
The three new chief of staffs, l to r army, navy and air force 
Navy chief-of-staff is more or less what was expected. 
Known as a career officer with extensive experience at sea, 
he has commanded several warships and and most recently 
served as the eastern fleet commander before being 
appointed as deputy governor of Lemhanas, the National 
Defence Institute. 
Both Djoko Suyanto and Slamet Soebijanto are from the 
class of 1973, like SBY, and they attended classes and 
underwent training together as young cadets. No doubt it 
was SBY who handpicked the three men to take over as the 
new chiefs-of-staff. SBY served as coordinating minister for 
security affairs under the previous two presidents, Gus Dur 
and Megawati, and knows how aggravating it is not to be in 
a position to control the top echelons of the armed forces. 
Ryacudu appoints hardliners 
It is well known that RR and SBY do .not get along. 
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During the Megawati presidency, it was clear that RR had a 
low regard for civilian politicians, and given that SBY has 
been a cabinet minister he is seen, despite his army back-
ground, as a civilian by the army hardliners. 
Before the appointment ofDjoko Santoso as the new army 
chief, RR hastily promoted several notorious hardliners to 
strategic positions in the army. 
Major General Sriyanto Muntrasan, the commander of 
Kopassus, the army's special forces, has been promoted to 
become commander of Siliwangi, the prestigious territorial 
command of the West Java and Ban ten provinces. Recently 
Sriyanto went on trial for his involvement in a bloodbath 
that occurred in 1984 in Tanjung Priok, the harbour of 
Jakarta. At the time he served as operational assistant of the 
Jakarta military command. His troops opened fire at random . 
at a demonstration, killing hundreds of innocent people. 
Nevertheless, Sriyanto was acquitted by the judges, much to 
the dismay of the Indonesian human rights community. The 
Attorney General's Office plans to file an appeal against the 
acquittal to the Supreme Court. 
Two other hardliners, Colonel Geerhan Lantara and 
Colonel Azmyn Yusri Nasution, both commanders of sub-
district commands in Aceh, have been promoted as chiefs-
of-staff respectively of the Army's Strategic Reserve 
Command (Kostrad) first and second division. The two offi-
cers are notorious for the heavy-handed way they ran their 
territorial commands during a particularly oppressive 
period of the civil emergency in Aceh. Lantara's track 
record is particularly bad as he is known to have provoked 
some young East Timorese during a peaceful march in 1991 
(which became known as the Santa Cruz massacre). The 
military retaliated by killing hundreds of innocent people. 
The position vacated by Colonel Azmyn Yusri Nasution as 
Lilawangsa commander (North and East Aceh) will go to 
Colonel Chairawan. Like Geerhan Lantara, Chairawan was 
grounded for several years because of his involvement in 
gross human rights violations. Chairawan was a member of 
Kopassus, the elite army unit under the command of General 
Prabowo, when a special unit was created: Tim Mawar 
(Team of Roses) which specialised in kidnapping pro-
democracy activists. Many of the activists are still unac-
counted for and are presumed dead. Like Lantara or Sriyanto, 
Chairawan was never charged for his offences. It was said 
that he had been demoted but now emerges from the ashes. 
Factionalism within the army 
Factionalism has always been a common feature in the 
Indonesian armed forces but in certain periods, battles 
between the factions have erupted in the open. Early in 
1998, when the crisis in the Suharto regime was reaching its 
peak, factionalism within the TNI (at that time still called 
ABRI) also reached a climax with open conflicts emerging 
between the factions. 
SBY, who was then in a top position at headquarters, as 
assistant for territorial affairs, became part of a group usually 
called the 'reformers'. There were two other factions known 
as 'hardliners' and 'professionals'. These three groupings had 
no formal membership or unifying political or ideological 
outlook, and allegiances were often fluid as some officer 
switched from one faction to another. Conflicts occasionally 
occurred within the factions such as happened during the 
days when Suharto was forced to step down. Two hardliners 
factions, under Wiranto and Prabowo, clashed openly and 
Jakarta was on the verge of becoming a battleground. 
The TNI reform faction's heyday lasted for a few years 
Hardliner General Ryacudu has been sidestepped 
and then withered away, when some of its key officers lost 
their strategic positions at headquarters. SBY managed to 
survive because he had already shed his battle dress to 
become a cabinet minister. When Gus Dur was impeached 
in 2002, the hardliners were back in prominence. 
The main bone of contention was the acceptance of civil-
ian supremacy. The reformers genuinely accepted civilian 
rule and in August 1998, a few months after the fall of 
Suharto, the notorious army doctrine, Dwi Fungsi (Dual 
Function) was ditched and replaced by a new doctrine 
called the' New Paradigm.' In theory this removed the TNI 
from playing a direct role in politics, shifting to its original 
function as the external defence force and the force for the 
preservation of national unity. 
However, the preservation of unity became the stepping-
stone for the military to meddle in politics again. After the 
collapse of the reform group, the army consisted of hardlin-
ers and professionals. 
The hardliners represent a sizeable group of officers, very 
much in the mould and tradition of the Indonesian army, 
which is characterised by a deep distrust of civilian politi-
cians and an unwillingness to accept civilian interference in 
military affairs. Since Independence in 1945, Indonesian 
politics have always been placed in jeopardy by the diffi-
culties in civil - military relations. Sukarno, Indonesia's first 
president, was ousted by the military, Gus Dur was 
impeached by a combination of military and civilian pres-
sure, while Megawati accepted the reality, giving the mili-
tary sufficient political room to manoeuvre. 
TNI and patriotism 
While SBY and RR have a different outlook towards accept-
ing civilian supremacy, they have much in common. They 
were bred in the same mould of security and socio-political 
functions in the seventies and eighties, seeing themselves as 
the guardians of national unity, development and cohesion. 
During the Cold War, Suharto as president held firmly to the 
anti-communist credo. All saw their raison d'etre as being to 
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play such a major role in day-to-day politics. 
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the fall of Suharto in 
1998, the weapon of anti-communism lost its purpose. A 
new ideological weapon has been invented and has been 
successfully imposed onto the political arena. The TNI 
propagates the active defence of the unitary state of 
Indonesia while at the same time instilling patriotism in the 
population. Domestically, Indonesia still faces dissent in 
Aceh and West Papua while elsewhere, in Poso and 
Maluku, religious or ethnic clashes have erupted. TNI is 
seen by many as the only force that can be uncompromising 
in dealing with these problems and able to counter attacks 
against the unitary state. 
The global situation and unilateral actions by the US have 
also created a new kind of anger and patriotism among 
Indonesians, which fits in with the petty nationalism being 
promoted by army leaders . 
Powerful presidential team 
SBY was elected in Indonesia's first ever, direct presiden-
tial elections. He won with a sizable majority but his victory 
didn't reflect the composition of the new DPR elected half 
a year earlier. In Parliament, there was a majority for the 
Megawati alliance, at a time when she was president. It took 
more than two months following his inauguration as 
President for SBY to change the political map and achieve 
a majority in the DPR. 
This happened when Yusuf Kalla, now vice-president, 
managed to seize the chairmanship ofGOLKAR, which had 
emerged as the biggest party in the elections, after being the 
ruling party throughout the Suharto era. Overnight, the 
Golkar fraction switched sides and became part of the 
ruling alliance. 
The new cabinet is much more open to the outside world 
than the more nationalist Megawati government. This is 
expressed in day-to-day politics. Two days after the tsunami, 
Yusuf Kalla announced that Aceh was open to international 
assistance, realised that Indonesia could not cope with a 
mega-disaster like this. These days, it is the military who are 
trying to close Aceh again to foreigners and by the end of 
March, special permits will be needed to visit Aceh. 
SBY has secured a working majority in parliament and 
democracy appears to be in good shape, with the govern-
ment functioning from a position of strength. In reality, the 
TNI and nationalist politicians will oppose him in many 
areas. It is too early to say whether his cabinet will be able 
to shift the country in the right direction. * 
==~====================================== 
MILITARY 
continued from page 14 
may have been to provide Wamang with weapons training. 
He has reportedly claimed that the attack was planned 
during this trip. In an interview with the Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation in August 2004, he admitted 
buying bullets from the TNI. 
ELSHAM says it has evidence concerning two other 
presumed co-conspirators who helped procure the weapons 
for the attack. One of the co-conspirators purchased auto-
matic rifles while staying at the home of serving TNI offi-
cer, Colonel Sugiono, it says. The weapons were stored at 
the Cikini police station in Jakarta. 
Rumbiak and others speculated that the TNI's motive for the 
attack was to seek higher security payments for protecting 
the Freeport mine. Such payments are a lucrative source of 
income for the TNI and the evidence suggests that Freeport 
made direct payments of up to $2,100 per month into the 
personal account of the regional military commander for 
West Papua. These payments were discontinued in the 
months leading up to the Timika killings. According to a 
communication from Freeport to the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission, the company paid the TNI $5 .6 
million in 2002 [John Rumbiak, Eben Kirksey and Ed 
McWilliams, statement issued 17 February 2005]. 
Leahy reaction 
Senator Leahy called Secretary Rice's decision 'prema-
ture and unfortunate' . The only reason why there has been 
progress in the case, he said, was due to pressure from 
Congress and Patsy Spier. 'Now the Secretary, in one of her 
first acts, has thrown away the last bit of leverage we had.' 
He suggested that Wamang is being left alone because of 
what he might reveal: 
'Why hasn't the one person indicted by the United States, 
who has confessed to the crime, been indicted and arrested 
in Indonesia? One can only surmise that since he has impli-
cated the Indonesian military, they don't want the FBI to 
interview him. This is not cooperation with the FBI, no 
matter what the Administration says.' [statement, 28 
February 2005] 
Current military ties 
Restrictions on IMET, which brings foreign military offi-
cers to the US for training, were first imposed in response 
to the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre in East Timor. All military 
ties were suspended following TNI involvement in the 
violent destruction of East Timor in 1999. Conditions were 
imposed requiring accountability for human rights viola-
tions in East Timor and a commitment to civilian control of 
the armed forces. These conditions were later replaced by 
the one requiring cooperation on the Timika killings. 
The US administration has allocated $600,000 for IMET 
for Indonesia in 2005. The two countries already enjoy a 
considerable level of military engagement following the 11 
September attacks. Current programmes and activities 
include expanded IMET (E-IMET) and the Counter-
Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP). The CTFP for 
Indonesia is the largest such programme anywhere in the 
world. Military exercises and other contacts through officer 
visits, educational exchanges and port visits also take place. 
The only remaining restriction will be on the sale of lethal 
equipment, but that may also be lifted soon. * 
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Renewal of US military ties a blow for Indonesian 
democracy 
On 26 February 2005, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 'determined that Indonesia has satis-
fied legislative conditions for restarting International Military and Educational Training (/MET)', a 
small but symbolically important part of the military relationship between the two countries. The deci-
sion is a major blow for Indonesia's fragile transition to democracy. 
Human rights campaigners are angry that the US decision 
was made for strategic reasons associated with the war 
against terror and ignored compelling evidence that 
Indonesia has not fulfilled the key condition which required 
co-operation by the Indonesian military (TNI) with the FBI 
in investigating the August 2002 killings of two Americans 
and one Indonesian near the Freeport copper-and-gold 
mine at Timika, West Papua. 
The decision represents a victory for the Indonesian 
government and those in the Bush administration, led by 
neoconservative cheerleader and former US Ambassador to 
Indonesia, Paul Wolfowitz, who have been pushing hard for 
re-engagement. The US has exploited the improved rela-
tions between the two countries following the contribution 
the American military and aid agencies made to the tsunami 
relief effort in Aceh. 
TNI as abusive as ever 
The tsunami relief operation has not, however, changed 
the nature of the TNI. It remains as powerful, abusive and 
unaccountable as ever. Secretary Rice's decision is remark-
able for the fact that just two days after it was announced, 
her own department issued its annual country report on 
Indonesia, which concluded that: "Government agents 
continued to commit abuse, the most serious of which took 
place in areas of separatist conflict. Security force members 
murdered, tortured, raped, beat and arbitrarily detained 
civilians and members of separatist movements, especially 
in Aceh and to a lesser extent in Papua." 
The problems of the TNI are systemic and unlikely to be 
addressed by the training of individual officers. The normal-
ising of relations endorses the role of the TNI and encourages 
its continued resistance to accountability and reform. 
Democrat Senator Patrick Leahy, who sponsored earlier 
conditions requiring Indonesia to bring to justice those 
responsible for human rights violations in East Timor, said 
" .. . the Secretary's decision will be seen by the Indonesian 
military authorities who have tried to obstruct justice as a 
friendly pat on the back" [statement issued 28 February 
2005]. 
Given the leading role played by Paul Wolfowitz, the 
scepticism expressed by fellow neoconservative Ellen Bork 
in an article entitled 'Premature Engagement' was somewhat 
surprising. She pointed out that although President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono was himself a graduate of IMET, US 
officials were reportedly dismayed to discover that 15 mili-
tary officers allegedly involved in crimes against humanity 
in East Timor were former IMET students. 
Bork argued that ' ... before any steps are taken, the admin-
istration should provide an accounting of past programs and 
their effectiveness in promoting reform, and outline a strat-
egy that integrates military cooperation into a plan for 
advancing democracy and human rights in Indonesia' [The 
Weekly Standard, 19 February 2005]. 
Unanswered questions about Timika killings 
The indictment by the US Department of Justice in June 
2004 of an alleged commander of the Free Papua 
Movement (OPM/TPN), Anthonius Wamang, for the 
Timika killings left many unanswered questions about the 
long-suspected role of the military in the deadly attack [see 
TAPOL Bulletin No 176, p. 18]. 
Patsy Spier - a survivor of the attack which killed her 
husband Rick - has questioned why Wamang has still not 
been apprehended despite his whereabouts being known, 
why Indonesia has not issued an arrest warrant, and why 
there was no apparent contact between the Indonesian police 
and the FBI for seven months after the indictment. In 
February 2004, she was told by Deputy Secretary of State, 
Richard Armitage, that 'cooperation' by the TNI was 
required until to the 'exhaustion' of the Timika case [email 
communication to members of Congress, 29 January 2005]. 
It is clear that the case has reached nowhere near exhaustion. 
Initial investigations by the Indonesian police and the 
respected West Papuan human rights organisation, 
ELSHAM provided strong indications that Kopassus special 
forces officers or other army were units used in the attack. 
The evidence suggested that whereas Papuan proxies such 
as Wamang may have participated in the attack, the opera-
tion was conceived and orchestrated by the military. 
New evidence of TNI involvement 
In a statement issued on 17 Feoruary 2005, John Rumbiak, 
international advocacy co-ordinator of ELSHAM, and US 
researchers urged Secretary Rice to consider new evidence 
of military involvement in the attack. They pointed to 
documentary evidence that the TNI paid for Wamang to 
visit Jakarta in January 2002 and suggested that the visit 
continued on page 13 
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£16.5 million arms bribe paid 
One of the most controversial British arms deals with Indonesia was made possible by the payment of 
a massive bribe to the eldest daughter of then dictator Suharto a recent High Court case has revealed. 
British arms company Alvis paid £16.5 million to Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana (aka Tutut) in the mid-
1990s to secure a contract for the export of 100 Scorpion light tanks and Stormer armoured vehicles 
according to documents obtained by the Guardian newspaper. 
The deal for the Scorpion and Stormer vehicles was vigor-
ously opposed at the time because of Indonesia's human 
rights record and its use of imported military equipment in 
East Timor and against its own citizens. It became a litmus 
test for the much-vaunted ethical foreign policy of the 
Labour government when it came to power under .Tony 
Blair in May 1997. 
The exports went ahead, however, and despite protests, 
some of the armoured vehicles were recently deployed to 
Aceh as part of Indonesia's martial law offensive, which 
began in May 2003 and claimed over 2,000 lives. 
Tutut's Global Select seals deal 
The payment of the bribe to Tutut was disclosed in witness 
statements in the case of Chan U Seek v. Alvis Vehicles 
Limited. In December 2004, The Guardian won the right to 
see the court file after Singapore businessman and former 
Alvis agent, Chan U Seek settled a claim against the 
company for commission relating to the sale of the 
Scorpions and Stormers. 
According to the witness statements, Alvis first met Tutut 
in London in February 1994. An agreement was made 
between Alvis and Global Select, a company owned by 
Tutut. Global Select then became instrumental in persuad-
ing Suharto's inner circle and the Indonesian Ministry of 
Defence to conclude the deal despite strong competition 
from a Korean firm. 
According to one of the witness statements, Indonesia was 
'keen to have delivery of half the consignment of vehicles 
by October 1995, the 50th anniversary of the Armed Forces, 
to allow them to participate in a major parade in the capital, 
Jakarta' [statement of Nick Prest, former Chairman and 
Chief Executive of Alvis]. 
Alvis freely admitted to making payments of £16.5 
million, around 10 per cent. of the contract price, to Tutut. 
The payments were described by Alvis executives as an 
'incentive' and a 'tax'. [See the court documents at 
www.guardian.co.uk/armstrade; see also 'Corruption Still 
Rife? Campaign Against Arms Trade at: 
http://www.caat.org.uk/information/magazine/0205/cov 
er-story.php.] 
A company owned by Tutut also allegedly made millions 
by acting as agent in the procurement of British-built Hawk 
jets in the mid-1990s ['Soeharto clan's past abuses emerge' 
Jakarta Post, 15 July 2002]. 
£550 million 'odious' debt cancelled 
The cost of the corrupt Alvis transaction, around £160 
million, is being met by the British and Indonesian public. 
The deal was underwritten by the British taxpayer through 
the Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD). When 
Indonesia's debts to Britain were rescheduled in 1998 
following the 1997 Asian economic crisis, ECGD paid out 
£93 million to Alvis for the Scorpions. It also paid around 
£400 million to BAE Systems for the Hawks and £150 
million to other arms companies [The Guardian, 20 
December 2004]. 
The rescheduled payments are due to continue to 2021 
[parliamentary written answer 13 January 2005, Hansard, 
col. 627W]. Until then the final cost to Indonesia and the 
British taxpayer will not be known. 
As at the end of November 2004, Indonesia still owed 
Britain £551 million for military equipment, including 
£80.7 million for the Scorpions and Stormers and £382.7 
million for the Hawks [parliamentary written answers, 10 
January 2005, Hansard, col. 132W and 13 January 2005, 
Hansard, col. 627W]. This means that vital Indonesian 
public funds - which could used for reconstruction and 
rehabilitation in Aceh or for health, education and other 
social services for Indonesia's poor - are being used to repay 
the 'odious' debt incurred to buy weapons often deployed 
against those most in need. 
TAPOL is calling for the British government to cancel all 
'odious' debt relating to arms sales so that Indonesians and 
Acehnese are not obliged to pay for weapons which may be 
used against them. This debt relief should be conditional 
upon the establishment of viable mechanisms of account-
ability and control to ensure that the funds released are 
disbursed to the most needy, are not dissipated by corrup-
tion, and are not misallocated to fuel civil conflicts or bene-
fit the Indonesian military. 
TAPOL is also joining calls for ECGD to seek repayment 
from Alvis of the amounts paid to the company in relation 
to the corrupt transaction secured by Tutut. 
UK readers are asked to write to their MP, House of 
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Commons, Westminster, London SWlA OAA asking him or 
her to press the National Audit Office to investigate the 
ECGD's decision to underwrite the Alvis and Hawk deals to 
ascertain whether they were a good use of taxpayer's 
money. Please contact TAPOL for more information. 
Blair government refused to revoke licences 
In March 1997, TAPOL had joined forces with Campaign 
Against Arms Trade and the World Development 
Movement (WDM) to apply for a judicial review of the 
government's decision to issue the export licences for the 
Scorpions, Stormers, and other equipment. The organisa-
tions argued that the decision to grant the licences was an 
unlawful application of government policy which prohib-
ited the export of equipment likely to be used for 'internal 
repression'. They presented substantial uncontested 
evidence of the previous use of similar equipment against 
Indonesian civilians. However, the court refused the appli-
cation. It effectively deci9ed that 'foreign policy consider-
ations' allowed the government to issue licences whatever 
the buyer's human rights record [see TAPOL Bulletin, No. 
140, p. 18]. 
When Tony Blair came to power within a few months in 
May 1997, hopes were raised that the new government's 
commitment to put human rights at the centre of its foreign 
policy would lead to a tightening of arms export controls and 
the ending of arms exports to Indonesia. The government 
came under intense pressure from campaigners, the media 
and MPs to revoke the licences for the Stormers, Scorpions 
and Hawks which had not yet been delivered to Indonesia. 
WDM obtained a legal opinion which confirmed the govern-
ment had the power to revoke the licences. However, it 
refused to do so. Its decision to go ahead with the exports 
was seen by many as confirmation of the still birth of the 
'ethical dimension' of foreign policy in the face of a deter-
mination to continue with 'business as usual' [see TAPOL 
Bulletins, No. 141, p. 18, No. 142, p. 1, No. 143, p. 7]. 
Human rights ignored 
In May 2004, following the deployment of Hawk jets and 
Stormer armoured vehicles to Aceh as part of Indonesia's 
deadly martial-law offensive, a committee of MPs accused 
the government of failing to investigate claims that the 
British-supplied equipment had been used in violation of 
human rights or for offensive purposes. The committee also 
severely criticised the government for failing to explain 
why in August 2002 it decided to relax end-use undertak-
ings on the use of British equipment in Aceh at a time when 
the human rights situation was giving grave cause for 
concern. This controversial and unannounced change of 
policy followed the admission in February 2002 that 
Indonesia had breached previous undertakings by deploying 
Stormer vehicles to Aceh [parliamentary written answer, 26 
February 2002, Hansard, col. 1188W]. 
The government's response to the MPs' criticisms, 
published in October 2004, revealed that it had ignored the 
human rights situation on the ground when it decided to 
allow the use of British-supplied equipment in Aceh. The 
response furthermore failed to address the serious issues of 
concern identified by the MPs, including the inadequacy of 
end-use monitoring. It raised more questions about the 
government's commitment to accountability and to ensuring 
that British equipment is not used in violation of human 
rights in Aceh or elsewhere. * 
Ex-tapols sue five presidents 
A class action has been filed against five Indonesian presi-
dents the Legal Aid Institute on behalf of men and women 
who have since 1965 borne the stigma of being alleged 
members of the banned Indonesian Communist Party. The 
Director of the Jakarta Legal Aid Institute (LBH Jaka~a), Uli 
Parulian Sihombing, announced on 9 March t~at .this class 
action had been filed with the Central Jakarta district court. 
'We have filed this action because our clients have, ever 
since 1965 been victims of allegations or stigmatisation as 
members ~f the PKI and they have been deprived of any 
recognition, protection or respect of their ri~hts as citizens. 
Their right to employment, to ownership of personal 
possessions, to education and their cultural rights have been 
violated,' he said. 
The class action is being filed against former Presidents 
Suharto, J.B. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati 
Sokarnoputri and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono: 
All these rights are guaranteed under the ·Indonesian 
Constitution and under Law No 39/1999 on Basic Human 
Rights as well as under the Universal Declaration ~f Hum~n 
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights. 
The class action is being filed because laws and regula-
tions enacted and implemented by Indonesian governments 
since the time of Suharto remain in force. [The Indonesian 
Communist Party, the PKI, was formally banned in March 
1966 though its members and sympathisers were the 
victims of massacres and mass arrests since October 1965 
when Suharto took power from Indonesia's first president, 
Sukarno.] 
Sihombing said that LBH Jakarta has been authorised by 
seven organisations representing victims of PKI stigmatisa-
tion to take this class action. One organisation represents 
members who were compelled to give up their jobs or were 
dismissed without receiving salaries, allowances or sever-
ance pay, another whose members were dismissed from 
state employment, the armed forces or the police without 
receiving pensions to which they were entitled; another 
whose members who had been subjected to special investi-
gation for not having 'a clean environment' and were there-
fore unable to find work. Another represents veterans enti-
tled to allowances which have been denied them, while 
another is composed of people whose land or property has 
been seized. Another organisation represents persons whose 
artistic creativity had been obstructed. 
Sihombing said that an estimated twenty million people 
were victims of PKI stigmatisation including thee million 
members or leaders of the PKI who were murdered, and 
seventeen million who were PKI sympathisers or admirers 
of President Sukarno, plus their children and grandchildren. 
The class action demands Rp 10 billion for each person 
represented by the action and calls on the Susilo govern-
ment to set up a team to assess the damages suffered by 
each victim. * 
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UN commission to review East Timor 
justice efforts 
On 18 February, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced the establishment of an indepen-
dent commission of three experts to review the progress made by judicial processes in Indonesia and 
East Timor towards accountability for serious violations of human rights committed in East Timor in 
1999. In a calculated move to pre-empt and undermine the work of the Commission, the governments 
of Indonesia and East Timor have agreed to set up a parallel Commission of Truth and Friendship. 
The Commission of Experts ('the Commission') will be May 2005. 
formally tasked with assessing the proceedings of Jakarta's The Commission must look at the ways in which the 
ad hoc human rights court - widely regarded as a travesty of Serious Crimes Unit can complete its tasks and ensure that 
justice - and the serious crimes process involving the evidence is transferred to any new mechanism. It should 
Serious Crimes Unit and the Special Panels for Serious consider whether the serious crimes process can itself be 
::--- -~-... transformed into a new interna-
Going Home 
Crimes in Dili. The three experts appointed by Kofi Annan 
are Justice Prafullachandra Bhagwati, a former chief justice 
of India, Professor Yozo Yokota of Japan, a former UN 
special rapporteur on Burma, and Ms Shaista Shameem, 
director of the Fiji human rights commission. 
The Commission is required to recommend further 
measures and/or mechanisms so that the perpetrators are 
held accountable, justice is secured for the victims and the 
people of East Timor, and reconciliation is promoted. 
The failure of the Jakarta trials and the obstacles and 
difficulties encountered by the serious crim.es process in 
East Timor have been well documented (1 ). The establish-
ment of the Commission is an admission that the two 
processes have not delivered justice. It has been welcomed 
by civil society groups in East Timor. 
There are a number of options which the Commission 
should consider and a combination of approaches may be 
appropriate (2). Its most immediate task should be to make 
recommendations concerning the future of the serious 
crimes process in East Timor as UN support is due to end in 
tional justice mechanism. In any 
event, the possibility of setting up 
some form of international crimi-
nal tribunal must be high on the 
Commission's agenda. 
Given Indonesia's refusal to co-
operate with any procedures 
which it does not control and the 
financial and political obstacles 
in the way of solving the problem 
of justice for East Timor, the task 
of the Commission will be diffi-
cult but not impossible. 
Its success is crucial to the UN's 
commitment to justice, peace and 
security for East Timor and to the 
struggle against impunity in 
Indonesia and elsewhere. 
Orchestrated destruc-
tion 
photo: Elaine Briere It is extremely doubtful whether the 
outcome of the parallel Commission 
of Truth and Friendship ('CTF') will bear any relation to the 
truth about the Indonesian army's orchestrated destruction 
of East Timor and its responsibility for intimidation, terror, 
killings and other acts of violence which resulted in over 
1,400 people being killed and 250,000 people being 
forcibly displaced to West Timor. Moreover, the CTF is 
unlikely to contribute to sustainable friendship between the 
peoples of Indonesia and East Timor given its apparent aim 
to bury the past ('bring to a closure a chapter of our recent 
past'), undermine the search for justice, and sanction 
impunity. 
Responding to the move by Jakarta and Dili, the New 
York-based East Timor Action Network said it was now up 
to the international community to pursue justice. 'The 
Commission of Truth and Friendship purports to provide 
definitive closure. The question is closure for whom?' ETAN 
said in a statement. 'The Commission of Truth and 
Friendship can only help provide closure to the Indonesian 
military's effort to avoid justice by enshrining their impunity.' 
The CTF was hastily agreed following a meeting in 
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Intended to Fail: The Trials Before the Ad Hoc Human 
Rights Court in Jakarta, International Center for 
Transitional Justice, August 2003: 
http://www.ictj .org/downloads/IntendedtoFail_designed.pd 
f' 
' 
December between President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
of Indonesia and President Xanana Gusmao of East Timor 
when it became clear that Kofi Annan was intent on setting 
up the Commission. The terms of reference were agreed on 
9 March. The East Timorese government's agreement to 
participate in the CTF process because of its desire to foster 
g~o.d . relations with its former occupier has been strongly 
cntlc1sed by East Timor's Catholic Church, human rights 
groups and many others. Justice for Timor Leste: The Way Forward, Amnesty 
.......,_......-... International and Judicial System Monitoring 
Programme, April 2004: http://web.amnesty.org/ 
library/index/ENGASA2 l 0062004; and 
President Gusmao from East Timor and President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono from Indonesia: an unequal relationship. 
The CTF's terms of reference state that the process will 
not lead to any prosecutions. Instead it can propose 
amnesties for those involved in human rights violations. It 
can also 'recommend rehabilitation measures for those 
wron.gly accused of human rights violations'. Remarkably 
the nghts of such accused are given precedence over the 
rights of victims since there is no similar provision for reha-
bilitation or reparation for victims. The victims are not 
mentioned throughout the CTF's lengthy terms of reference. 
An editorial about the CTF in the Jakarta Post newspaper 
posed the question whether Indonesia can come to terms 
with its own history, or whether it will once again tum 
history into fiction ['Reconciling East Timor' Jakarta Post, 
23 February 2005]. The latter outcome is almost certain. 
On~ of the main features of the Jakarta trials was the way in 
~h1ch b.oth the prosecution and the defence comprehen-
sively distorted the truth about events in East Timor. The 
violence was falsely portrayed as a resulting from a strug-
gle between two violent East Timorese factions in which the 
Indonesian security forces were essentially bystanders. 
Primary blame was directed at the UN. 
The establishment of the CTF is also likely to undermine 
the work of East Timor's Reception, Truth and 
R~conciliation Commission and the value of its final report 
due for publication later this year. 
The Jakarta Post pointed out that Indonesia could be seen 
as a bully on the CTF since 'real politik defines the rela-
tionship between Indonesia and East Timor as an unequal 
one'. That is certainly the case and it is difficult to see how 
the CTF will do anything but serve the interests of the 
power-holders in Indonesia. 
1. See, for example: 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 176, pp. 1 &2; No. 1711172, p. 22; 
Unfulfilled Promises: Achieving Justice for 
Crimes Against Humanity in East Timor, Open 
Society Justice Initiative and Coalition for 
International Justice, November 2004: 
http://www.cij.org/pdf/ 
Unfulfilled _Promises_ Achieving_ 
Justice_ for_ Crimes_ Against_ Humanity_ 
in_ East_ Timor. pdf 
2. For suggestions, see ibid. and Rethinking Justice 
for East Timor, Watch Indonesia & others, February 
2005 : http:// 
home.snafu.de/watchin/Rethinking_Justice.htm 
continued from page 23 
In January, a report was received from Reverend 
Socrates Yoman, head of the West Papuan Baptist 
Church, saying that eight Papuans from the village of 
Tolikara had been arrested for allegedly being members 
of the OPM. The eight men are: Simele Gere, Natan 
Wenda, Menis Wenda, Yohanis Heluka, Solamia Weya, 
Yatimun Weya, Benyyus Kogaya and John Heluka. 
Arson attacks in Wunin 
While this problem in Puncak Jaya was still causing 
grave concern and remained unresolved, another incident 
occurred in Wurineri village in Wunin district in the 
· Tolikara region, about fifty kilometres from Puncak Jaya. 
Oi: 2.1 January, a school and several local government 
bmldmgs were set on fire and destroyed by unidentified 
peopl~ who were dr~ssed as civilians but carrying 
machme guns. People m the area believe that the attack-
ers were in fact members of Kopassus. Many villagers 
reportedly fled into the bush. * 
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Pramoedya celebrates his 80th birthday 
Indonesia's in~ernationally renowned writer and novelist, Pramoedya Ananta Toer was the focus 
of congratulations from home and abroad as he celebrated his eightieth birthday on 6 February. 
For a "!an w~o suffered fourteen years in unlawful detention under Suharto, including ten years 
on the inhospitable Buru Island, he was surprisingly hale and hearty. 
At a party to celebrate the occasion at the Taman Ismail 
Marzuki culture centre in Jakarta, he was relaxed and full of 
smiles. 'I have done all that I wanted to do and I am already in 
possession o~ all that I always wanted to have. I want to spend 
my old age m peace,' he said at the gathering attended by 
hundreds of admirers. [The Jakarta Post, 11 February 2005] 
Known by one and all as Pram, the revered writer said: 'I 
am amazed how I have been given such a long life consid-
ering _the fact that I was born premature and have al~ays had 
a vanety of health problems. He told his well-wishers that 
the panacea for all his ailments had been the onion. But no 
doubt the constant companionship and care of his devoted 
wife, Maemunah Thamrin, niece of the national hero M.H. 
Thamrin, has been instrumental in seeing him through. 
His 34 books and a vast range of essays have been trans-
lated into 3 7 languages, including English, Dutch, German, 
French and even Catalan. 
When asked on his birthday whether he was still writing, 
his favourite quip was: 'Only to sign my pay receipts.' He 
told journalists that his only literary activity these days is 
collecting information for an encyclopaedia on Indonesian 
geography. 
Pram was born in Blora, one of the most impoverished 
towns in Central Java, the eldest son of M Toer, the head-
master of a nationalist school, Budi Oetomo. His father was 
an activist in the Indonesian National Party (PNI) founded 
by Sukarno, Indonesia's first president, in the mid-1920s. 
As he told the friends gathered around him, it was his father 
who gave him a political perspective, while his mother 
taught him about life's principles, 'to count on myself and 
not to ask for God's help in my daily affairs. Praying to God 
only displays our frailty as human beings,' he said. 
He did not do well at school; it took him ten years to 
complete the seven-year elementary school course. After 
leaving school, he had no schooling for a year as his father 
did not approve of education. But by earning a small income 
from street trading, he was able to pay for a trip to Surabaya, 
in East Java, and emol at a radio vocational school. 
During the first months of the Japanese occupation in 
1942, he looked after his family until his mother's death. He 
joined a paramilitary youth organisation, then, at the end of 
the war, he joined the Siliwangi Division of the newly-
created Indonesian army in West Java for a while. 
First arrest 
During his term as a second lieutenant, he was arrested for 
the first time by the Dutch authorities for making anti-colo-
nial remarks. He was imprisoned in Bukit Duri jail, Jakarta, 
where his literary career began. He wrote a series of short 
stories which were later published in a collection, Percikan 
Revolusi (The Spark of Revolution) and his first novel 
Perburuan (Hunting) which won him a prize from the 
publishing house, Balai Pustaka. 
In 1953, he moved to Holland with his family at the invi-
tation of the Dutch-Indonesian Institute for Cultural Co-
operation, Sticusa, where he wrote and published several 
more books. 
After returning to Indonesia in 1958, he joined LEKRA, 
the leftwing cultural organisation, and from 1962 to 1965 
he was the editor of Lentara, the cultural page of a leftwing 
daily, Bintang Timur. Along with almost all Indonesian 
national and local newspapers, this newspaper was banned 
when Suharto seized power in 1965. 
Among the works he published before he was arrested in 
late 1965 was Panggil Aku Kartini Sadja, (Just Call Me 
Kartini), a biography ofKartini, the Indonesian woman who 
became famous for her writings and educational activities at 
the end of the 19th century, and a book about ethnic Chinese 
called Hoa Kiau di Indonesia. 
Deportation to Buru Island 
After the events of October 1965 which led to General 
Suharto's seizure of power, he was accused with hundreds of 
thousands of others of being a communist and a member of 
the PKI, which he vehemently denied. He was arrested at his 
home in late October, spent time in several prisons in Java, 
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and was then exiled to Buru Island in Maluku along with 
more than 30,000 other untried and uncharged prisoners. The 
mobs who raided his home at the time of his arrest destroyed 
the manuscript of a book he was writing, ransacked his 
library and burned papers containing entries he had collected 
for an encyclopaedia he was preparing to publish. 
Writing about his transfer from the prison island of 
Nusakembangan, off the south coast of Central Java, to 
Buru on 16 August 1969, he said: 
'Over the ship's loudspeakers we heard: "Gentlemen, we 
wish you a pleasant journey to a new life. " 
'In the hold where we were kept behind iron doors, alto-
gether 500 of us, a layer of excrement spread over us as we 
lay on the floor, every time the stem was lifted by the 
waves .... Most of us were village people who· had never 
seen the sea before. Everyone was promptly seasick.' 
On arrival at their destination, Namlea the capital of Burn 
island, 'not a mortal was to be seen. Later we heard that the 
authorities, alluding to our yellow prison clothes, had told 
the population, "The yellow army will soon be coming. 
They are thieves, murderers and rapists, so clear off." 
Pram's experiences on Burn were recounted in a book, 
Nyanyian Sunyi Seorang Bisu, (Silent Song of a Mute). 
Under conditions of extreme depravation on Burn he was 
able to continue with his literary activities after the military 
authorities bowed to growing international pressure about 
the scandalous political prisoner situation by offering 
concessions to the prisoners. 
As one of Indonesia's best-known political prisoners, 
Pram was permitted to have a typewriter and granted 
p~rmission ~o write and it was there that he started writing 
his masterpiece, the Buru Quartet, consisting of This Earth 
of Mankind, A Child of All Nations, Footsteps and House of 
GI.ass. These were stories that he had been relating to his co-
pnsoners, who spread them by word of mouth to others. 
During the Suharto era, all his books were banned; 
however, they were published in Malaysia and circulated 
clandestinely in Indonesia. In the mid 1980s, several 
students in Yogyakarta were arrested and sentenced for sell-
ing his books. Subsequently, the publishing house, Hasta 
Mitra, run by his close friend, Jusuf Ishak, started to publish 
his works in Indonesia. 
Besides his prolific writings, Pram has also translated 
many world classics, including books by John Steinbeck, 
Leo Tolstoy, Maxim Gorky.and other Russian writers. 
Living these days in a new house some distance from 
Jakarta, Pram has plenty to be proud of 
We wish him: MANY HAPPY RETURNS! 
Indonesia's Human Rights Courts 'the 
worst in the world', says senior judge 
There is growing dissatisfaction with the way the Human 
Rights Courts law is working, according to a judge who 
served on the panel of judges in several human rights cases. 
Speaking at a seminar in Jakarta on 'Human Rights 
Perspectives in State Affairs', Judge Rudy Rizki said that the 
law which was enacted in 2000 did not provide a clear defini-
tion of 'grave human rights', nor did it include war crimes. 
Another weakness was that the law provides no safeguards 
for the security of judges while trials are in progress. As an 
example of the problem, he said that trials where serious 
human rights violations in East Timor were being heard were 
attended by hundreds of Kopassus soldiers who turned up in 
court in their uniforms, some of whom were bearing arms. 
When the verdicts were about to be announced, Kopassus 
soldiers started yelling threats at the judges. 'It was very 
intimidating because there were no guards to protect the 
judges,' he said 
Moreover, the quality of the judges and prosecutors serving 
in these courts was far from adequate. The physical arrange-
ments in court should pay special attention to the security of 
the judges. 
With all these weaknesses, it is not surprising that in almost 
every case the verdicts were very disappointing especially for 
the international community. 
Judge Rudy Rizki said that Indonesia's human rights courts 
were the worst in the world and it was just as well that a 
Commission of Experts had been set up to consider 
Indonesia's handling of human rights abuses in East Timor. 
These problems had arisen, he said, because those drafting 
the law had been half-hearted. The law has been drafted in 
great haste and with no intention of producing a law that 
would deal thoroughly with the problem of human rights 
violations in Indonesia. [Suara Pembaruan, 9 March 2005] 
As we report elsewhere in this issue, not a single Indonesian 
officer was found guilty at any of the human rights court 
trials. * 
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In West Papua, confusion reigns supreme 
While a_t the weste~n end of Indonesia, Aceh has been opened up thanks to the forces of nature, West 
1:apua 1~ the. east is cut off fr~m outside observation. Access is limited to the capital, Jayapura, while 
in the interior, the ln~ones1an ~rmed forces are staking out their positions. Although Special 
Auto~omy was grant~d in 2001, this has been superseded by a decision to split the territory into several 
provinces. M eanwh1le, two Papuans are on trial for organising a peaceful demonstration last 
December and many others are serving prison sentences for 'rebellion '. 
The law adopted in September 2001 to grant 
West Papua the status of special autonomy was 
seen as recognition that Jakarta needed to 
respond to widespread dissatisfaction and the 
unabated expression of support for indepen-
dence. 
In June 2000, a hugely successful congress 
was held in Jayapura which rallied tens of thou-
sands of Papuans from right across the 
province, setting up Presidium Dewan Papua, 
the ~apuan Presidium Council. The congress 
received the go-ahead from then president, 
Abdurrachman Wahid (Gus Dur), including 
substantial financial support. Gus Dur's 
approach to West Papuan aspirations has 
always been more tolerant than the nationalistic 
posturing of most of Indonesia's political elite. 
He also agreed to the province of Irian Jaya 
being re-named Papua and allowing the 
Morning Star flag, the symbol of Papuan aspi-
rations for independence, to be flown, though 
always alongside the Indonesian flag. But all 
senior Indonesian politicians, including Gus Dur, 
adhere .firmly to NKRI, the Unitary State of the 
Republic of Indonesia, and strongly discourage 'separatism' 
that could lead to the 'loss' of another territory, after the 
decision by the vast majority of East Timorese in a 1999 
referendum to reject incorporation with Indonesia. 
Special autonomy law 
The Special Autonomy Law provides for substantial devo-
lution of decision-making and financial resources. It incor-
porated the draft of the law that had been drawn up by acad-
emics, NGOs and church leaders and provided for the 
setting up of an all-Papuan Papuan Assembly (MRP) with 
the right to be consulted on matters of major importance in 
the governance of the province. 
However, even before the regulations needed for imple-
menting Special Autonomy had been introduced, fears were 
being expressed in Jakarta that West Papua's new status was 
nothing less than a step towards independence. In January 
2002, the governor of the National Resilience Institute, 
Professor Ermaya Suradinata, argued that partition was the 
best way to avoid any unfortunate developments encour-
aged by the autonomy law. 
Without acknowledging the incompatibility of partition 
into three (or perhaps even five) provinces with special 
autonomy, Presidential Regulation No 1/2003 was intro-
duced, providing for the partition of West Papua into three 
provinces each using the name of 'lrian Jaya'. The West 
Demonstration against autonomy 
Irian Jaya was created in early 2003 and a governor 
appointed, but attempts to inaugurate the Central Irian Jaya 
province ~n August of that year sparked such protest and 
clashes with the security forces in Timika, the putative capi-
tal, that the inauguration was abandoned. 
The decisions were adopted and implemented even before 
the all-Papuan MRP had been set up, the body that should 
according to the Special Autonomy Law, be consulted o~ 
such a decision. 
To a~d to the cm:;ifu~ion, in late 2003, Indonesia's recently-
est~bhshe~ ~onstitutwnal Court passed down a ruling that 
whil~ partition was 1:111~onstitutional, the West Irian Jaya 
provmce should remam m existence, on the grounds that the 
Court could not take retroactive decisions. 
An Australian academic has linked this confusion with the 
interests of the security forces in West Papua: 'The political 
ec~momy.ofth~ security fo~ces in Irian Jaya and the symbi-
otic relationships the secunty forces have developed with 
th~ :esou:ce companies, most notably the copper-and-gold 
~mmg giant Fre~port, have created an institution impera-
tive for the mamtenance of the territory as a zone of 
con~ict.' [Richard Chauvel, 'Australia's Strategic 
Environment: The Problem of Papua' in Agenda, Vol. 11, 
No 1, 2004.] 
1 December celebration banned 
A yearly event in West Papua is a demonstration to mark 
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the anniversary of 1 December. On this day in 1961, at a 
time when West Papua was still under Dutch rule, Papuan 
leaders assembled to assert their right to become an inde-
pendent state and adopted the Morning Star flag as their 
national symbol. Ceremonies at which the Morning Star is 
unfurled have occurred repeatedly, especially since 1998 
and the downfall of Suharto, incurring the wrath of the civil 
and military authorities. 
Three days before the anniversary in 2004, the governor, 
JP Salossa, along with the military commander and the 
provincial chief of police issued a statement banning events 
to celebrate the occasion. 
Regardless of the ban, several hundred Papuans gathered 
on Trikora Field in Abepura, on the outskirts of Jayapura, 
and raised the flag. Soon after, a contingent of police 
advanced towards the crowd and fired warning shots. At 
least four people were injured, two of whom sustained 
bullet wounds. A woman in the crowd was trampled on in 
the crush, and a human rights monitor who was trying to 
photograph the police attack was beaten up. As they were 
outnumbered by the crowd, the police were forced to retreat 
until riot police reinforcements arrived, and succeeded in 
pulling down the flag and putting an end to the entirely 
peaceful demonstration. 
A 47-year old Papuan, Filip Karma was arrested as the 
ceremony was underway and driven off to the police 
station. A large crowd went to the police station to protest 
and demand his release, and around twenty people were 
arrested. All were subsequently released, except Yusak 
Pakage who has remained in detention ever since along 
with Filip Karma. 
On trial for rebellion 
The two men are now on trial facing the charge of rebel-
lion under Articles 106 and 110 of the Criminal Code, for 
which the maximum penalty is life imprisonment. They are 
also being charged under Article 154 for hatred towards the 
state, for which the maximum penalty is seven years. It is 
common practice for prosecutors to lay both harsh and more 
lenient charges so as to ensure a conviction. Whatever the 
case may be, this is clearly a violation of freedom of expres-
sion. As we went to press, the trials were still underway. 
According to a statement issued by Amnesty International 
USA on 1February2005, more than 72 Papuans have been 
put on trial since late 1998 in connection with activities in 
support of independence. These have included organising or 
attending meetings in which Papua's political status was 
discussed and ceremonies to unfurl the Morning Star. 
Two men who were detained during a peaceful flag-rais-
ing ceremony at Cendrawasih University on 14 December 
2002, were found guilty of rebellion in October 2003 and 
sentenced to two years. 
In 2001, four Papuans, Reverend Obeth Komba, Amelia 
Yiggibalom, Reverend Yudas Meage and Murjono Murib, 
were sentenced to four years imprisonment for rebellion. 
They were all members of the Wamena Panel of the Papuan 
Presidium Council. They were accused of instigating 
violence in October of that year even though evidence 
presented in court showed that they had been trying to 
prevent it. The police told them to find those responsible for 
acts of violence which had occurred but they were unwill-
ing to do so. They were then charged and convicted of 
rebellion on the basis of their being members of the Panel 
and attending meetings held to discuss independence. All 
four as still serving their sentences. 
ELSHAM wins award 
The leading human rights organisation in West Papua, 
ELSHAM has won international acclaim with an award 
from the Fiji-based Regional Rights Resource Team which 
is affiliated to the UN Development Programme (UNDP). 
Acting chairman of EL SHAM, Aloysius Renwarin, told the 
press that ELS~ has ~on the awar.d 'as ~he Team
1 
appre-
ciated our work m defendmg human nghts m Papua . 
The award was presented in Fiji with a certificate and a 
cash award of 2,000 Fiji dollars to the organisation's repre-
sentative abroad, Rex Rumakiek. 
ELSHAM was set up in 1998 and has since then been the 
major source of information for TAPOL and other interna-
tional organisations about human rights abuses in an area 
where human rights activists still take enormous person~! 
risks in pursuance of their activities even though Suharto is 
no longer in charge and Indonesia is said to be on the tran-
sition to democracy. 
Inciting conflict . 
Leading Papuan organisations have been callmg for years 
for West Papua to be declared a land of peace, a call which 
has resulted in TPN, the armed wing of the OPM 
(Organisasi Papua Merdeka), announcing a decision to 
avoid becoming engaged in armed conflict. 
But clearly the Indonesian armed forces have other ideas. 
As Richard Chauvel, whose article is quoted above, puts it: 
'The security forces have no interest in conflict getting out 
of control, but they have little interest in its resolution.' 
In the past few years, there have been a number of 
provocative incidents which seem to be designed to infuri-
ate local communities and incite violence, providing the 
security forces with the pretext to clamp down on alleged 
members of the OPM. Since the latter months of 2004, 
several apparently contrived incidents have occurred in the 
Central Highlands. [See separate item.] 
Huge BP investment for West Papua 
The British corporation, BP, was given the go-ahead by 
the Indonesian government in March to establish a huge 
natural gas project in Bintuni Bay, on the north coast of 
West Papua, known as the Tangguh project. In anticipation 
of problems for the local communities, a large number of 
organisations and individuals in the UK including TAPOL, 
along with a coalition of organisations and individuals from 
West Papua, Indonesia, New Zealand, Australia and the US 
co-signed a letter to Lord Browne, the chief executive of 
BP, and Senator George Mitchell who chairs the Tangguh 
Independent Advisory Panel. 
The letter expresses deep concern over the failure of the 
company to establish rigorous and credible human rights 
monitoring and reporting processes, more two years after 
such commitments were made'. One of the signatories, John 
O'Reilly, a former senior vice-president of BP Indonesia 
who resigned several years ago, said: 'If the Tangguh 
Project is to achieve its ambitions in setting world-class 
standards, then active and robust human rights policies in 
West Papua are essential if BP is not to repeat its bad expe-
riences in Columbia. The delay in implementing such key 
policies in disquieting.' 
Following the letter, activists have attending several meet-
ings with senior executives of BP. These meetings are 
expected to continue in the coming months. * 
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Stirring up conflict in West Papua 
The Indonesian armed forces are trying to provoke conflicts in West Papua, to justify their presence 
and maintain their security role for major foreign investment projects in a territory replete with natural 
resources. Freeport is the world's largest copper-and-gold mine, and BP has received the go-ahead to 
invest in West Papua's natural gas round Bintuni Bay in the north. West Papua also has rich tropical 
forests that are being denuded by unrestrained illegal logging. Since August, several incidents have 
occurred in the Central Highlands, causing thousands of people to flee from their homes. 
Puncak J aya atrocities 
Puncak Jaya situation in the Central Highlands has become 
the focus of attention in Indonesia and internationally 
because of reports that dozens of villagers had died from 
starvation after thousands fled their villages late last year. 
The trouble began last August with the construction of an 
airstrip in Tinggi Nabut district, Gurage kampung. This was 
traditional land belonging to the Tabuni tribe as well as to 
several local margas. At the same time, construction 
of the Wamena-Mulia highway was underway. 
Trees were being felled in a protected forest which 
the landowners regarded as a violation of their 
rights. A member of the tribe, Goliath Tabuni was 
delegated to try to resolve the problem. 
However, the security forces alleged that Goliath 
was intending to disrupt the celebration of 
Indonesia's national day on 17 August and that he 
was in the OPM. When a contingent of Kopassus 
troops was dispatched to the region, they were 
attacked by an unknown armed group and Goliath 
was blamed for the attack. 
A month later, on 14 September, as troops were 
still hunting for Goliath, they encountered a pastor, 
Reverend Eliza Tabuni, and his son, Mathias on 
their way to a place of worship. Challenged to 
reveal the whereabouts of Goliath, Rev. Tabuni said 
he knew nothing whereupon he was tied up and 
shot dead. His son, who was wounded in the neck, 
managed to flee. 
In October, another pastor, Reverend Yason Koyoga, 
was questioned regarding Goliath and threatened with 
suffering the same fate as Rev. Tabuni. 
A few days earlier, it was alleged that six non-Papuans who 
were working on the road construction had been attacked 
and went missing though the company for which they 
~orked denied that any of their employees had gone miss-
mg. 
As the search for Goliath continued, the army conducted 
sweepings around Mulia where several public buildings had 
been destroyed. 
On 17 October, troops launched operations on the ground 
and from the air, they dropped bombs (which fortunately 
did not explode) on a gathering of villagers. 
Terrified by these military operations, the members of a 
number of local churches fled into the forest, fearing for 
their safety. It was later reported that several thousand 
people (according to one source as many as 5,000) had fled, 
They have remained in the forest ever since, while their 
gardens have been neglected while they have suffered seri-
ous food shortages and lack of clothing needed for the 
bitterly cold nights. 
By the end of 2004, reports were being smuggled out that 
the villagers were dying of starvation or hunger-related 
diseases. Shortly before we went to press, we received a 
hand-written list of fifty-three names of male and female 
villagers who had died in the forest. Their ages range from 
15 years to 89 years. 
Mass grave in Puncak Jaya 
At the end of November, three Papuan churches issued a 
statement calling for an investigation team to be set up by 
Komnas HAM, the National Human Rights Commission, to 
conduct an investigation into the killing of Rev. Tabuni and 
the military operations that had caused thousands of 
villagers to flee their villages. They called for troops in the 
area to be withdrawn because 'as long as the military still 
exist in Mulia, the people won't return because of the 
trauma they have had with the military since 1977'. They 
also called for a humanitarian team to visit the area to help 
villagers return home. 
Eight months later, there is still no sign that anything will 
be done to restore the villagers to their homes and identify 
the members of the security forces who shot Rev. Tabuni 
and later attacked villagers who were simply going about 
their daily activities. As a Dutch priest who recently left 
West Papua after living there for thirty years told TAPOL, 
the Papuans have shown amazing restraint and resilience in 
the fact of such provocations. 
continued on page 18 
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play in the seeking new initiatives for the peace agenda. 
The cycle of violence in Aceh has created a deep distrust 
among many Acehnese towards initiatives taken by the 
central government. Rebuilding trust and good will is 
therefore vital before the Acehnese can again be involved. 
War weariness is widespread among the Acehnese which 
means that the main thrust of a peace agenda should 
involve a process of transformation from violence to peace. 
It has become clear that a structure is needed in the near 
future to include members of civil society in the peace 
process. 
Experts in conflict resolution have emphasised the 
importance of initiating a peace-building process from 
within Aceh civil society itself. · These include academics 
who are experts in Acehnese contemporary history, 
members of legislative bodies, both national or local, repre-
sentatives of social-religious organisations and active 
members of Acehnese civil society organisations. 
Prominent members of Indonesian civil society should 
also be involved in this important discussion to seek a 
sustainable peace in Aceh. In the last few years Indonesian 
academics and prominent members of Indonesian NGOs 
have developed new ideas and initiatives on how to 
proceed. 
International experts on Aceh should also be included 
in this second-track diplomacy initiative. In the past two or 
three years, many important international initiatives have 
taken place. Peace in Aceh and the role of civil society was 
the topic in conferences at the European Parliament in 
Brussels, in Conflict Resolution in Aceh conferences in 
Holland, the UK, the US, Germany, Finland, Malaysia and 
Thailand. The issue of Peace in Aceh was also discussed at 
the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil in February 
2005, as well as at the Asia-Europe People's Forum in 
Hanoi in September 2004, the European Social Forum in 
London in October 2004 and in several National Social 
Forum gatherings. 
The post-Tsunami era has created enormous good will 
for Aceh in many parts of the world and has created a 
windows of opportunities to make this new round of peace 
talks a profound success in the long term. * 
========================================= 
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have suffered greatly. Things got even worse when Acheh 
coastal areas were struck by the earthquake and tsunami on 
26 December. At a time when our people's fundamental 
rights and needs were far from being realised, a terrible 
catastrophe only added to their sufferings. 
This is why, from my prison-cell, I call on people around 
the world, the international community and the UN, every-
one concerned about human rights and peace, to help 
restore peace in Acheh. Help is urgently needed to resolve 
the political problems in Acheh; this is no less important 
than relief aid for the tsunami victims. Now is the time for 
the international community to understand and respect the 
wish of the Achehnese people to determine their own 
future by peaceful, democratic means. 
The international community should press the Indonesian 
Government and GAM to call a permanent halt to hostili-
ties as the first step towards comprehensive peace. All 
political detainees or convicted prisoners should be uncon-
ditionally released immediately, as the beginning of a 
peace process. Everyone should recognise that since the 
days of Sukarno and the Dutch era, war and violence has 
failed to resolve the conflict in Acheh. This situation has 
brought neither victory for Indonesia nor defeat for the 
Achehnese. All it has done is destroy freedom, justice, 
human rights and peace. It is absolutely clear t~at the 
special autonomy that has been imposed from the time of 
Sukarno to the adoption of the Law for Nanggroe ~cheh 
Darussalam (NAD) has failed to resolve the conflict or 
bring peace and justice to Acheh. 
We look to the international community to help end the 
sufferings of the people of Acheh. 
Freedom Greetings! 
Malang Prison, East Java, 12 February 2005 
* This is the spelling used by the writer. 
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